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authorLibravatar vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com>2024-05-04 14:06:06 -0400
committerLibravatar vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com>2024-05-04 14:06:06 -0400
commite7375560d465f6da71aae0483c0e7a72535ccc10 (patch)
treebbdfcb275ec0b66cfe84b7f8024258eef6c7aa5a /src/noscrypt.c
parent7485aa5a43476c47d54ec51fb96751a14e0ed629 (diff)
Squashed commit of the following:
commit 0a40e209d03e8ff9b6f81cd5969d3e845c633bfc Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sat May 4 13:55:19 2024 -0400 ci: Force disable testing for win ci builds commit 55fae189fffc86f07a3448370f0a746670819712 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Thu May 2 21:54:35 2024 -0400 feat: Working and tested openssl impl & defaults commit 6ff8bb11774c51fd341b7699a3938fd894995fbf Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Thu Apr 25 17:45:42 2024 -0400 refactor: Finish support and testing for mbedtls commit 7cb7a93de4f6f5e741bc5129e3d928e44f050930 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Tue Apr 23 18:19:31 2024 -0400 refactor!: MbedTLS on Windows, switch to uint32 commit 30e8dda6cbea86bdee6d5dfe48514385d3b9f81b Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Tue Apr 23 14:48:05 2024 -0400 refactor: Crypto dep redesign working on Windows commit d09c6c1bd5da3e2d79351daeba304ca99976a726 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Thu Apr 18 00:28:51 2024 -0400 refactor!: Pushing what I have to dev commit 54e06ada7d624ed0d28c6a6db04a149708841bf8 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sat Apr 13 01:24:00 2024 -0400 fix: convert constants to hex, inline macro, ParseErrorCode commit 4215e3100d9a0d23119080d09638fa5b60d0c6d4 Merge: d3328f4 7485aa5 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Wed Apr 3 18:26:30 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit d3328f4152b22b28f24c43dda62464287f1efff5 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Wed Apr 3 18:22:56 2024 -0400 build: Included dependency and versions in client builds commit b11bc0bac955fd5c6db65f0da48456bf5e748805 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Wed Apr 3 18:10:08 2024 -0400 fix: Fix c89 compatabilty comments and struct assignment commit 9915bd41799a72413e6b400e150aa9f5fa797e25 Merge: 8e3d6ea 5184d7d Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sat Mar 30 09:57:30 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 8e3d6ea5e3c83fe42cb904b6ccc4fe2b73f76aae Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sat Mar 30 09:52:55 2024 -0400 refactor!: Some api (struct) changes and updated tests commit e88e8420520204e20802516f01d4488bb0b1d6ea Merge: 490dfee 21f6c0a Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sun Mar 3 15:02:34 2024 -0500 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 490dfee4ef22479009627435c6ad728c3cbbab54 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sun Mar 3 14:59:25 2024 -0500 test: #3 tests for encryption/description and Macs commit efa97490b7ed47f4e2f05bee52e2b33e14e439e6 Merge: 1b84e3c 120022a Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sun Mar 3 14:55:48 2024 -0500 merge master commit 1b84e3c7c2e55b1ff9ffdd09b66873e11c131441 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sat Mar 2 22:57:36 2024 -0500 fix: #2 constent usage of sizeof() operator on struct types commit 9de5a214c66adea0ef2d0bac63c59449de202a88 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Fri Mar 1 14:30:36 2024 -0500 perf: avoid nc_key struct copy, cast and verify instead commit b917b761120ed684af28d0707673ffadcf14b8fe Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Mon Feb 12 22:06:50 2024 -0500 fix: found the constant time memcompare function commit 9f85fff3b9f25da7410569ea94f994b88feb3910 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Fri Feb 9 22:48:35 2024 -0500 feat: added/update MAC functions to sign or verify nip44 payload commit aa5113741bb419b02d6ea416bba571fa3d65db46 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Wed Feb 7 01:37:53 2024 -0500 add missing hmac-key output buffer commit 55f47d22cc9ce4d1e22b70814d608c7ef3b1bbc9 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Sun Feb 4 21:08:13 2024 -0500 simple bug fixes, and public api argument validation tests commit 73c5a713fb164ae8b4ac8a891a8020e08eae0a3b Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Fri Feb 2 23:05:48 2024 -0500 update api to return secpvalidate return code instead of internal return codes commit 06c73004e1a39a7ea4ea3a89c22dee0f66adb236 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Fri Feb 2 19:25:17 2024 -0500 change to lgpl license commit 6e79fdb3b6b6739fc7797d47e55a7691306cf736 Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Wed Jan 31 21:30:49 2024 -0500 move validation macros, and optionally disable them commit ac1e58837f1ba687939f78b5c03cadd346c10ddd Author: vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com> Date: Tue Jan 30 12:25:05 2024 -0500 couple more tests, renable range checks, set flags for all projects
Diffstat (limited to 'src/noscrypt.c')
-rw-r--r--src/noscrypt.c467
1 files changed, 189 insertions, 278 deletions
diff --git a/src/noscrypt.c b/src/noscrypt.c
index 8aeeefe..fac3dfb 100644
--- a/src/noscrypt.c
+++ b/src/noscrypt.c
@@ -15,40 +15,21 @@
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
-* along with NativeHeapApi. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
+* along with noscrypt. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
*/
#include "noscrypt.h"
-#include <secp256k1_ecdh.h>
-#include <secp256k1_schnorrsig.h>
+#include "nc-util.h"
+#include "nc-crypto.h"
-/* Setup mbedtls */
-#include <mbedtls/platform_util.h>
-#include <mbedtls/md.h>
-#include <mbedtls/hkdf.h>
-#include <mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h>
-#include <mbedtls/chacha20.h>
-#include <mbedtls/sha256.h>
-#include <mbedtls/constant_time.h>
-
-/* Non win platforms may need an inline override */
-#if !defined(_NC_IS_WINDOWS) && !defined(inline)
- #define inline __inline__
-#endif /* !IS_WINDOWS */
-
-/* NULL */
-#ifndef NULL
- #define NULL ((void*)0)
-#endif /* !NULL */
-
-#define CHACHA_NONCE_SIZE 12 /* Size of 12 is set by the cipher spec */
-#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 32 /* Size of 32 is set by the cipher spec */
+#include <secp256k1/secp256k1_ecdh.h>
+#include <secp256k1/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h>
/*
* Local macro for secure zero buffer fill
*/
-#define ZERO_FILL(x, size) mbedtls_platform_zeroize(x, size)
+#define ZERO_FILL(x, size) ncCryptoSecureZero(x, size)
/* Include string for memmove */
#include <string.h>
@@ -62,6 +43,7 @@
#define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_INVALID_ARG, argPos);
#define CHECK_NULL_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_NULL_PTR, argPos);
#define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) if(x < min || x > max) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE, argPos);
+ #define CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, argPos) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, argPos)
#else
/* empty macros */
#define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x)
@@ -69,35 +51,11 @@
#define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos)
#endif /* !NC_DISABLE_INPUT_VALIDATION */
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
- /* Must include assert.h for assertions */
- #include <assert.h>
- #define DEBUG_ASSERT(x) assert(x);
- #define DEBUG_ASSERT2(x, message) assert(x && message);
-
- /*
- * Compiler enabled static assertion keywords are
- * only available in C11 and later. Later versions
- * have macros built-in from assert.h so we can use
- * the static_assert macro directly.
- *
- * Static assertions are only used for testing such as
- * sanity checks and this library targets the c89 standard
- * so static_assret very likely will not be available.
- */
- #if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L
- #define STATIC_ASSERT(x, m) static_assert(x, m)
- #elif !defined(STATIC_ASSERT)
- #define STATIC_ASSERT(x, m)
- #pragma message("Static assertions are not supported by this language version")
- #endif
-
-#else
- #define DEBUG_ASSERT(x)
- #define DEBUG_ASSERT2(x, message)
- #define STATIC_ASSERT(x, m)
-#endif
+/*
+* The Nip44 constant salt
+* https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/blob/master/44.md#encryption
+*/
+static const uint8_t Nip44ConstantSalt[8] = { 0x6e, 0x69, 0x70, 0x34, 0x34, 0x2d, 0x76, 0x32 };
struct shared_secret {
uint8_t value[NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE];
@@ -122,16 +80,23 @@ struct nc_expand_keys {
uint8_t hmac_key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE];
};
+
/* Pointer typecast must work between expanded keys
* and message key, size must be identical to work
*/
-STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct nc_expand_keys) == sizeof(struct message_key), "Expected struct nc_expand_keys to be the same size as struct message_key");
+STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct nc_expand_keys) == sizeof(struct message_key), "Expected struct nc_expand_keys to be the same size as struct message_key")
+
+/*
+* Check that the fallback hkdf extract internal buffer is large enough
+* for full converstation key buffers
+*/
+STATIC_ASSERT(HKDF_IN_BUF_SIZE >= NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE + 8, "HKDF Buffer size is too small for Safe HKDF operations")
/*
* Internal helper functions to do common structure conversions
*/
-static inline int _convertToXonly(const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly)
+static _nc_fn_inline int _convertToXonly(const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly)
{
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(compressedPubKey != NULL, "Expected a valid public 32byte key structure")
@@ -157,14 +122,17 @@ static int _convertToPubKey(const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* compressedP
MEMMOV((compressed + 1), compressedPubKey, sizeof(NCPublicKey));
result = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx->secpCtx, pubKey, compressed, sizeof(compressed));
-
- /* zero everything */
+
ZERO_FILL(compressed, sizeof(compressed));
return result;
}
-static inline int _convertFromXonly(const NCContext* ctx, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly, NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey)
+static _nc_fn_inline int _convertFromXonly(
+ const NCContext* ctx,
+ const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly,
+ NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey
+)
{
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(xonly != NULL, "Expected valid X-only secp256k1 public key structure.")
@@ -239,163 +207,138 @@ static NCResult _computeSharedSecret(
&_edhHashFuncInternal,
NULL
);
-
- /* Clean up sensitive data */
+
ZERO_FILL(&pubKey, sizeof(pubKey));
/* Result should be 1 on success */
- return result > 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ return result == 1 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
}
-static inline const mbedtls_md_info_t* _getSha256MdInfo(void)
-{
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* info;
- /* Get sha256 md info for hdkf operations */
- info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256);
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(info != NULL, "Expected SHA256 md info struct to be valid")
- return info;
-}
-
-
-static inline NCResult _computeConversationKey(
+static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _computeConversationKey(
const NCContext* ctx,
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo,
const struct shared_secret* sharedSecret,
struct conversation_key* ck
)
{
- int opResult;
- /* Validate internal args */
+ cspan_t saltSpan, ikmSpan;
+
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(sharedSecret != NULL, "Expected a valid shared-point")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdInfo != NULL, "Expected valid md context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected a valid conversation key")
-
- /* Derive the encryption key */
- opResult = mbedtls_hkdf_extract(
- mdInfo,
- Nip44ConstantSalt,
- sizeof(Nip44ConstantSalt),
- (uint8_t*)sharedSecret, /* Shared secret is the input key */
- NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE,
- (uint8_t*)ck /* Output produces a conversation key */
- );
- /* Return success if the hkdf operation was successful */
- return opResult == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ ncSpanInitC(&saltSpan, Nip44ConstantSalt, sizeof(Nip44ConstantSalt));
+ ncSpanInitC(&ikmSpan, sharedSecret->value, NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE);
+
+ return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(&saltSpan, &ikmSpan, ck->value) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
}
/*
* Explode the hkdf into the chacha key, chacha nonce, and hmac key.
*/
-static inline const struct nc_expand_keys* _expandKeysFromHkdf(const struct message_key* hkdf)
+static _nc_fn_inline const struct nc_expand_keys* _expandKeysFromHkdf(const struct message_key* hkdf)
{
return (const struct nc_expand_keys*)hkdf;
}
-static int _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCCryptoData* args)
+static cstatus_t _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCEncryptionArgs* args)
{
DEBUG_ASSERT2(keys != NULL, "Expected valid keys")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
- return mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(
+ return ncCryptoChacha20(
keys->chacha_key,
keys->chacha_nonce,
- 0, /* Counter (always starts at 0) */
- args->dataSize, /* Data size (input and output are assumed to be the same size) */
args->inputData, /* Input data */
- args->outputData /* Output data */
+ args->outputData, /* Output data */
+ args->dataSize /* Data size (input and output are assumed to be the same size) */
);
}
-static inline NCResult _getMessageKey(
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo,
+static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _getMessageKey(
const struct conversation_key* converstationKey,
- const uint8_t* nonce,
- size_t nonceSize,
+ const cspan_t* nonce,
struct message_key* messageKey
)
{
- int result;
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdInfo != NULL, "Expected valid md context")
+ cspan_t prkSpan;
+ span_t okmSpan;
+
DEBUG_ASSERT2(nonce != NULL, "Expected valid nonce buffer")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(converstationKey != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(messageKey != NULL, "Expected valid message key buffer")
- /* Another HKDF to derive the message key with nonce */
- result = mbedtls_hkdf_expand(
- mdInfo,
- (uint8_t*)converstationKey, /* Conversation key is the input key */
- NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE,
- nonce,
- nonceSize,
- (uint8_t*)messageKey, /* Output produces a message key (write it directly to struct memory) */
- NC_MESSAGE_KEY_SIZE
- );
-
- return result == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ ncSpanInitC(&prkSpan, converstationKey->value, sizeof(struct conversation_key)); /* Conversation key is the input key */
+ ncSpanInit(&okmSpan, messageKey->value, sizeof(struct message_key)); /* Output produces a message key (write it directly to struct memory) */
+
+ /* Nonce is the info */
+ return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(&prkSpan, nonce, &okmSpan);
}
-static inline NCResult _encryptEx(
+static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _encryptEx(
const NCContext* ctx,
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdINfo,
const struct conversation_key* ck,
- uint8_t hmacKey[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
- NCCryptoData* args
+ uint8_t* hmacKey,
+ NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
NCResult result;
+ cspan_t nonceSpan;
struct message_key messageKey;
const struct nc_expand_keys* expandedKeys;
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdINfo != NULL, "Expected valid md info struct")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacKey != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key buffer")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacKey != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key buffer")
- /* Failure, bail out */
- if ((result = _getMessageKey(mdINfo, ck, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, &messageKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
+ result = NC_SUCCESS;
+
+ ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+ /* Message key will be derrived on every encryption call */
+ if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
}
- /* Expand the keys from the hkdf so we can use them in the cipher */
+ /* Split apart the message key into it's expanded form so components can be extracted */
expandedKeys = _expandKeysFromHkdf(&messageKey);
/* Copy the hmac key into the args */
MEMMOV(hmacKey, expandedKeys->hmac_key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE);
/* CHACHA20 (the result will be 0 on success) */
- result = (NCResult)_chachaEncipher(expandedKeys, args);
+ if (_chachaEncipher(expandedKeys, args) != CSTATUS_OK)
+ {
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ }
Cleanup:
- /* Clean up sensitive data */
ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey));
return result;
}
-static inline NCResult _decryptEx(
- const NCContext* ctx,
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo,
- const struct conversation_key* ck,
- NCCryptoData* args
-)
+static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptEx(const NCContext* ctx, const struct conversation_key* ck, NCEncryptionArgs* args)
{
NCResult result;
+ cspan_t nonceSpan;
struct message_key messageKey;
const struct nc_expand_keys* cipherKeys;
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdInfo != NULL, "Expected valid md info struct")
- /* Failure to get message keys, bail out */
- if ((result = _getMessageKey(mdInfo, ck, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, &messageKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
+ result = NC_SUCCESS;
+
+ ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+ if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
}
@@ -403,34 +346,28 @@ static inline NCResult _decryptEx(
cipherKeys = _expandKeysFromHkdf(&messageKey);
/* CHACHA20 (the result will be 0 on success) */
- result = (NCResult) _chachaEncipher(cipherKeys, args);
+ if (_chachaEncipher(cipherKeys, args) != CSTATUS_OK)
+ {
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ }
Cleanup:
- /* Clean up sensitive data */
ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey));
return result;
}
-static inline int _computeHmac(
- const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
- const NCMacVerifyArgs* args,
- uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE]
-)
+static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _computeHmac(const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], const cspan_t* payload, sha256_t hmacOut)
{
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut != NULL, "Expected valid hmac output buffer")
- DEBUG_ASSERT(args->payload != NULL)
-
- return mbedtls_md_hmac(
- _getSha256MdInfo(),
- key,
- NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE,
- args->payload,
- args->payloadSize,
- hmacOut
- );
+ cspan_t keySpan;
+
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(payload != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut != NULL, "Expected valid hmac output buffer")
+
+ ncSpanInitC(&keySpan, key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ return ncCryptoHmacSha256(&keySpan, payload, hmacOut);
}
static NCResult _verifyMacEx(
@@ -440,31 +377,25 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx(
)
{
NCResult result;
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* sha256Info;
+ cspan_t payloadSpan, nonceSpan;
+ sha256_t hmacOut;
const struct nc_expand_keys* keys;
struct message_key messageKey;
- uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE];
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(conversationKey != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args")
- sha256Info = _getSha256MdInfo();
+ ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ncSpanInitC(&payloadSpan, args->payload, args->payloadSize);
/*
- * We need to get the message key in order to
- * get the required hmac key
+ * Message key is again required for the hmac verification
*/
- result = _getMessageKey(
- sha256Info,
- (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey,
- args->nonce32,
- NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE,
- &messageKey
- );
- if (result != NC_SUCCESS)
+ if (_getMessageKey((struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
}
@@ -474,24 +405,22 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx(
/*
* Compute the hmac of the data using the computed hmac key
*/
- if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, args, hmacOut) != 0)
+ if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
}
/* constant time compare the macs */
- result = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hmacOut, args->mac32, NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE) == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ result = ncCryptoFixedTimeComp(hmacOut, args->mac32, NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE) == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
Cleanup:
- /* Clean up sensitive data */
ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey));
ZERO_FILL(hmacOut, sizeof(hmacOut));
return result;
}
-
/*
* EXTERNAL API FUNCTIONS
*/
@@ -502,7 +431,7 @@ NC_EXPORT uint32_t NC_CC NCGetContextStructSize(void)
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCInitContext(
NCContext* ctx,
- const uint8_t entropy[32]
+ const uint8_t entropy[NC_CONTEXT_ENTROPY_SIZE]
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
@@ -510,18 +439,21 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCInitContext(
ctx->secpCtx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
- /* Randomize once on init */
+ /*
+ * Randomize once on init, users can call reinit to
+ * randomize again as needed.
+ */
return secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx->secpCtx, entropy) ? NC_SUCCESS : E_INVALID_ARG;
}
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCReInitContext(
NCContext* ctx,
- const uint8_t entropy[32]
+ const uint8_t entropy[NC_CONTEXT_ENTROPY_SIZE]
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(entropy, 1)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
/* Only randomize again */
return secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx->secpCtx, entropy) ? NC_SUCCESS : E_INVALID_ARG;
@@ -529,8 +461,8 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCReInitContext(
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDestroyContext(NCContext* ctx)
{
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0);
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0);
+ CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
/* Destroy secp256k1 context */
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx->secpCtx);
@@ -553,7 +485,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetPublicKey(
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
@@ -577,14 +509,11 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetPublicKey(
return NC_SUCCESS;
}
-NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCValidateSecretKey(
- const NCContext* ctx,
- const NCSecretKey* sk
-)
+NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCValidateSecretKey(const NCContext* ctx, const NCSecretKey* sk)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
/* Validate the secret key */
return secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sk->key);
@@ -606,13 +535,13 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignDigest(
/* Validate arguments */
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(random32, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(digest32, 3)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 4)
- /* Generate the keypair */
+ /* Fill keypair structure from the callers secret key */
if (secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx->secpCtx, &keyPair, sk->key) != 1)
{
return E_INVALID_ARG;
@@ -628,8 +557,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignDigest(
/* Verify the signature is valid */
result = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sig64, digest32, 32, &xonly);
-
- /* cleanup any sensitive data */
+
ZERO_FILL(&keyPair, sizeof(keyPair));
ZERO_FILL(&xonly, sizeof(xonly));
@@ -641,11 +569,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignData(
const NCSecretKey* sk,
const uint8_t random32[32],
const uint8_t* data,
- size_t dataSize,
+ uint32_t dataSize,
uint8_t sig64[64]
)
{
- uint8_t digest[32];
+ cspan_t dataSpan;
+ sha256_t digest;
/* Double check is required because arg position differs */
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
@@ -655,8 +584,10 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignData(
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(dataSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 4)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 5)
+ ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize);
+
/* Compute sha256 of the data before signing */
- if(mbedtls_sha256(data, dataSize, digest, 0) != 0)
+ if(ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
return E_INVALID_ARG;
}
@@ -676,7 +607,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyDigest(
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(digest32, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 3)
@@ -689,8 +620,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyDigest(
/* Verify the signature */
result = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sig64, digest32, 32, &xonly);
-
- /* cleanup any sensitive data */
+
ZERO_FILL(&xonly, sizeof(xonly));
return result == 1 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_INVALID_ARG;
@@ -700,11 +630,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyData(
const NCContext* ctx,
const NCPublicKey* pk,
const uint8_t* data,
- const size_t dataSize,
+ const uint32_t dataSize,
const uint8_t sig64[64]
)
{
- uint8_t digest[32];
+ sha256_t digest;
+ cspan_t dataSpan;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 1)
@@ -712,8 +643,10 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyData(
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(dataSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 3)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 4)
+ ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize);
+
/* Compute sha256 of the data before verifying */
- if (mbedtls_sha256(data, dataSize, digest, 0) != 0)
+ if (ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
return E_INVALID_ARG;
}
@@ -732,17 +665,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetSharedSecret(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(otherPk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sharedPoint, 3)
- return _computeSharedSecret(
- ctx,
- sk,
- otherPk,
- (struct shared_secret*)sharedPoint
- );
+ return _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, otherPk, (struct shared_secret*)sharedPoint);
}
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKeyEx(
@@ -752,14 +680,13 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKeyEx(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sharedPoint, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 2)
/* Cast the shared point to the shared secret type */
return _computeConversationKey(
- ctx,
- _getSha256MdInfo(),
+ ctx,
(struct shared_secret*)sharedPoint,
(struct conversation_key*)conversationKey
);
@@ -776,7 +703,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKey(
struct shared_secret sharedSecret;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 3)
@@ -787,12 +714,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKey(
goto Cleanup;
}
- result = _computeConversationKey(
- ctx,
- _getSha256MdInfo(),
- &sharedSecret,
- (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey
- );
+ result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey);
Cleanup:
/* Clean up sensitive data */
@@ -804,72 +726,72 @@ Cleanup:
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncryptEx(
const NCContext* ctx,
const uint8_t conversationKey[NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE],
- uint8_t hmacKeyOut[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
- NCCryptoData* args
+ NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKeyOut, 2)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
+ CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2)
/* Validte ciphertext/plaintext */
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3)
- CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3)
-
- return _encryptEx(
- ctx,
- _getSha256MdInfo(),
- (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey,
- hmacKeyOut,
- args
- );
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 2)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 2)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 2)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 2)
+ CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 2)
+
+ return _encryptEx(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args);
}
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncrypt(
const NCContext* ctx,
const NCSecretKey* sk,
- const NCPublicKey* pk,
- uint8_t hmacKeyOut[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
- NCCryptoData* args
+ const NCPublicKey* pk,
+ NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
NCResult result;
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo;
struct shared_secret sharedSecret;
struct conversation_key conversationKey;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKeyOut, 3)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 4)
+ CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
/* Validate input/output data */
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 4)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 4)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 4)
- CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 4)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 3)
+ CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3)
- mdInfo = _getSha256MdInfo();
+ switch(args->version)
+ {
+ case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44:
+ break; /* Allow nip44 */
+ /* At the moment nip04 compatability is not supported */
+ case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04:
+ default:
+ return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
/* Compute the shared point */
if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS)
{
goto Cleanup;
}
-
+
/* Compute the conversation key from secret and pubkic keys */
- if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, mdInfo, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
+ if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
{
goto Cleanup;
}
- result = _encryptEx(ctx, mdInfo, &conversationKey, hmacKeyOut, args);
+ result = _encryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args);
Cleanup:
/* Clean up sensitive data */
@@ -882,11 +804,11 @@ Cleanup:
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecryptEx(
const NCContext* ctx,
const uint8_t conversationKey[NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE],
- NCCryptoData* args
+ NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2)
@@ -896,28 +818,22 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecryptEx(
CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 2)
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 2)
- return _decryptEx(
- ctx,
- _getSha256MdInfo(),
- (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey,
- args
- );
+ return _decryptEx(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args);
}
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecrypt(
const NCContext* ctx,
const NCSecretKey* sk,
const NCPublicKey* pk,
- NCCryptoData* args
+ NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
NCResult result;
struct shared_secret sharedSecret;
struct conversation_key conversationKey;
- const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
@@ -928,19 +844,17 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecrypt(
CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3)
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3)
- mdInfo = _getSha256MdInfo();
-
if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS)
{
goto Cleanup;
}
- if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, mdInfo, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
+ if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
{
goto Cleanup;
}
- result = _decryptEx(ctx, mdInfo, &conversationKey, args);
+ result = _decryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, args);
Cleanup:
/* Clean up sensitive data */
@@ -954,28 +868,25 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NCComputeMac(
const NCContext* ctx,
const uint8_t hmacKey[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
const uint8_t* payload,
- size_t payloadSize,
+ uint32_t payloadSize,
uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE]
)
{
- NCMacVerifyArgs args;
+ cspan_t payloadSpan;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKey, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(payload, 2)
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(payloadSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 3)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacOut, 4)
- /*Fill args with 0 before use because we are only using some of the properties*/
- ZERO_FILL(&args, sizeof(args));
- args.payload = payload;
- args.payloadSize = payloadSize;
+ ncSpanInitC(&payloadSpan, payload, payloadSize);
/*
* Compute the hmac of the data using the supplied hmac key
*/
- return _computeHmac(hmacKey, &args, hmacOut) == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ return _computeHmac(hmacKey, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
}
@@ -986,7 +897,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMacEx(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2)
@@ -1005,8 +916,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMac(
NCMacVerifyArgs* args
)
{
+ NCResult result;
+ struct shared_secret sharedSecret;
+ struct conversation_key conversationKey;
+
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
@@ -1016,22 +931,18 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMac(
CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3)
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->payloadSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3)
- NCResult result;
- struct shared_secret sharedSecret;
- struct conversation_key conversationKey;
-
/* Computed the shared point so we can get the converstation key */
if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS)
{
goto Cleanup;
}
- if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, _getSha256MdInfo(), &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
+ if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
{
goto Cleanup;
}
- result = _verifyMacEx(ctx, (uint8_t*)&conversationKey, args);
+ result = _verifyMacEx(ctx, conversationKey.value, args);
Cleanup:
/* Clean up sensitive data */