From e7375560d465f6da71aae0483c0e7a72535ccc10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vnugent Date: Sat, 4 May 2024 14:06:06 -0400 Subject: Squashed commit of the following: commit 0a40e209d03e8ff9b6f81cd5969d3e845c633bfc Author: vnugent Date: Sat May 4 13:55:19 2024 -0400 ci: Force disable testing for win ci builds commit 55fae189fffc86f07a3448370f0a746670819712 Author: vnugent Date: Thu May 2 21:54:35 2024 -0400 feat: Working and tested openssl impl & defaults commit 6ff8bb11774c51fd341b7699a3938fd894995fbf Author: vnugent Date: Thu Apr 25 17:45:42 2024 -0400 refactor: Finish support and testing for mbedtls commit 7cb7a93de4f6f5e741bc5129e3d928e44f050930 Author: vnugent Date: Tue Apr 23 18:19:31 2024 -0400 refactor!: MbedTLS on Windows, switch to uint32 commit 30e8dda6cbea86bdee6d5dfe48514385d3b9f81b Author: vnugent Date: Tue Apr 23 14:48:05 2024 -0400 refactor: Crypto dep redesign working on Windows commit d09c6c1bd5da3e2d79351daeba304ca99976a726 Author: vnugent Date: Thu Apr 18 00:28:51 2024 -0400 refactor!: Pushing what I have to dev commit 54e06ada7d624ed0d28c6a6db04a149708841bf8 Author: vnugent Date: Sat Apr 13 01:24:00 2024 -0400 fix: convert constants to hex, inline macro, ParseErrorCode commit 4215e3100d9a0d23119080d09638fa5b60d0c6d4 Merge: d3328f4 7485aa5 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Apr 3 18:26:30 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit d3328f4152b22b28f24c43dda62464287f1efff5 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Apr 3 18:22:56 2024 -0400 build: Included dependency and versions in client builds commit b11bc0bac955fd5c6db65f0da48456bf5e748805 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Apr 3 18:10:08 2024 -0400 fix: Fix c89 compatabilty comments and struct assignment commit 9915bd41799a72413e6b400e150aa9f5fa797e25 Merge: 8e3d6ea 5184d7d Author: vnugent Date: Sat Mar 30 09:57:30 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 8e3d6ea5e3c83fe42cb904b6ccc4fe2b73f76aae Author: vnugent Date: Sat Mar 30 09:52:55 2024 -0400 refactor!: Some api (struct) changes and updated tests commit e88e8420520204e20802516f01d4488bb0b1d6ea Merge: 490dfee 21f6c0a Author: vnugent Date: Sun Mar 3 15:02:34 2024 -0500 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 490dfee4ef22479009627435c6ad728c3cbbab54 Author: vnugent Date: Sun Mar 3 14:59:25 2024 -0500 test: #3 tests for encryption/description and Macs commit efa97490b7ed47f4e2f05bee52e2b33e14e439e6 Merge: 1b84e3c 120022a Author: vnugent Date: Sun Mar 3 14:55:48 2024 -0500 merge master commit 1b84e3c7c2e55b1ff9ffdd09b66873e11c131441 Author: vnugent Date: Sat Mar 2 22:57:36 2024 -0500 fix: #2 constent usage of sizeof() operator on struct types commit 9de5a214c66adea0ef2d0bac63c59449de202a88 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Mar 1 14:30:36 2024 -0500 perf: avoid nc_key struct copy, cast and verify instead commit b917b761120ed684af28d0707673ffadcf14b8fe Author: vnugent Date: Mon Feb 12 22:06:50 2024 -0500 fix: found the constant time memcompare function commit 9f85fff3b9f25da7410569ea94f994b88feb3910 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Feb 9 22:48:35 2024 -0500 feat: added/update MAC functions to sign or verify nip44 payload commit aa5113741bb419b02d6ea416bba571fa3d65db46 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Feb 7 01:37:53 2024 -0500 add missing hmac-key output buffer commit 55f47d22cc9ce4d1e22b70814d608c7ef3b1bbc9 Author: vnugent Date: Sun Feb 4 21:08:13 2024 -0500 simple bug fixes, and public api argument validation tests commit 73c5a713fb164ae8b4ac8a891a8020e08eae0a3b Author: vnugent Date: Fri Feb 2 23:05:48 2024 -0500 update api to return secpvalidate return code instead of internal return codes commit 06c73004e1a39a7ea4ea3a89c22dee0f66adb236 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Feb 2 19:25:17 2024 -0500 change to lgpl license commit 6e79fdb3b6b6739fc7797d47e55a7691306cf736 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Jan 31 21:30:49 2024 -0500 move validation macros, and optionally disable them commit ac1e58837f1ba687939f78b5c03cadd346c10ddd Author: vnugent Date: Tue Jan 30 12:25:05 2024 -0500 couple more tests, renable range checks, set flags for all projects --- src/noscrypt.c | 467 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 189 insertions(+), 278 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/noscrypt.c') diff --git a/src/noscrypt.c b/src/noscrypt.c index 8aeeefe..fac3dfb 100644 --- a/src/noscrypt.c +++ b/src/noscrypt.c @@ -15,40 +15,21 @@ * Lesser General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License -* along with NativeHeapApi. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +* along with noscrypt. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. */ #include "noscrypt.h" -#include -#include +#include "nc-util.h" +#include "nc-crypto.h" -/* Setup mbedtls */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -/* Non win platforms may need an inline override */ -#if !defined(_NC_IS_WINDOWS) && !defined(inline) - #define inline __inline__ -#endif /* !IS_WINDOWS */ - -/* NULL */ -#ifndef NULL - #define NULL ((void*)0) -#endif /* !NULL */ - -#define CHACHA_NONCE_SIZE 12 /* Size of 12 is set by the cipher spec */ -#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 32 /* Size of 32 is set by the cipher spec */ +#include +#include /* * Local macro for secure zero buffer fill */ -#define ZERO_FILL(x, size) mbedtls_platform_zeroize(x, size) +#define ZERO_FILL(x, size) ncCryptoSecureZero(x, size) /* Include string for memmove */ #include @@ -62,6 +43,7 @@ #define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_INVALID_ARG, argPos); #define CHECK_NULL_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_NULL_PTR, argPos); #define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) if(x < min || x > max) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE, argPos); + #define CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, argPos) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, argPos) #else /* empty macros */ #define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x) @@ -69,35 +51,11 @@ #define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) #endif /* !NC_DISABLE_INPUT_VALIDATION */ - -#ifdef DEBUG - /* Must include assert.h for assertions */ - #include - #define DEBUG_ASSERT(x) assert(x); - #define DEBUG_ASSERT2(x, message) assert(x && message); - - /* - * Compiler enabled static assertion keywords are - * only available in C11 and later. Later versions - * have macros built-in from assert.h so we can use - * the static_assert macro directly. - * - * Static assertions are only used for testing such as - * sanity checks and this library targets the c89 standard - * so static_assret very likely will not be available. - */ - #if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L - #define STATIC_ASSERT(x, m) static_assert(x, m) - #elif !defined(STATIC_ASSERT) - #define STATIC_ASSERT(x, m) - #pragma message("Static assertions are not supported by this language version") - #endif - -#else - #define DEBUG_ASSERT(x) - #define DEBUG_ASSERT2(x, message) - #define STATIC_ASSERT(x, m) -#endif +/* +* The Nip44 constant salt +* https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/blob/master/44.md#encryption +*/ +static const uint8_t Nip44ConstantSalt[8] = { 0x6e, 0x69, 0x70, 0x34, 0x34, 0x2d, 0x76, 0x32 }; struct shared_secret { uint8_t value[NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE]; @@ -122,16 +80,23 @@ struct nc_expand_keys { uint8_t hmac_key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE]; }; + /* Pointer typecast must work between expanded keys * and message key, size must be identical to work */ -STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct nc_expand_keys) == sizeof(struct message_key), "Expected struct nc_expand_keys to be the same size as struct message_key"); +STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(struct nc_expand_keys) == sizeof(struct message_key), "Expected struct nc_expand_keys to be the same size as struct message_key") + +/* +* Check that the fallback hkdf extract internal buffer is large enough +* for full converstation key buffers +*/ +STATIC_ASSERT(HKDF_IN_BUF_SIZE >= NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE + 8, "HKDF Buffer size is too small for Safe HKDF operations") /* * Internal helper functions to do common structure conversions */ -static inline int _convertToXonly(const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly) +static _nc_fn_inline int _convertToXonly(const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly) { DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context") DEBUG_ASSERT2(compressedPubKey != NULL, "Expected a valid public 32byte key structure") @@ -157,14 +122,17 @@ static int _convertToPubKey(const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* compressedP MEMMOV((compressed + 1), compressedPubKey, sizeof(NCPublicKey)); result = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx->secpCtx, pubKey, compressed, sizeof(compressed)); - - /* zero everything */ + ZERO_FILL(compressed, sizeof(compressed)); return result; } -static inline int _convertFromXonly(const NCContext* ctx, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly, NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey) +static _nc_fn_inline int _convertFromXonly( + const NCContext* ctx, + const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly, + NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey +) { DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context") DEBUG_ASSERT2(xonly != NULL, "Expected valid X-only secp256k1 public key structure.") @@ -239,163 +207,138 @@ static NCResult _computeSharedSecret( &_edhHashFuncInternal, NULL ); - - /* Clean up sensitive data */ + ZERO_FILL(&pubKey, sizeof(pubKey)); /* Result should be 1 on success */ - return result > 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; + return result == 1 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; } -static inline const mbedtls_md_info_t* _getSha256MdInfo(void) -{ - const mbedtls_md_info_t* info; - /* Get sha256 md info for hdkf operations */ - info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256); - DEBUG_ASSERT2(info != NULL, "Expected SHA256 md info struct to be valid") - return info; -} - - -static inline NCResult _computeConversationKey( +static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _computeConversationKey( const NCContext* ctx, - const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo, const struct shared_secret* sharedSecret, struct conversation_key* ck ) { - int opResult; - /* Validate internal args */ + cspan_t saltSpan, ikmSpan; + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context") DEBUG_ASSERT2(sharedSecret != NULL, "Expected a valid shared-point") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdInfo != NULL, "Expected valid md context") DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected a valid conversation key") - - /* Derive the encryption key */ - opResult = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( - mdInfo, - Nip44ConstantSalt, - sizeof(Nip44ConstantSalt), - (uint8_t*)sharedSecret, /* Shared secret is the input key */ - NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE, - (uint8_t*)ck /* Output produces a conversation key */ - ); - /* Return success if the hkdf operation was successful */ - return opResult == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; + ncSpanInitC(&saltSpan, Nip44ConstantSalt, sizeof(Nip44ConstantSalt)); + ncSpanInitC(&ikmSpan, sharedSecret->value, NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE); + + return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(&saltSpan, &ikmSpan, ck->value) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; } /* * Explode the hkdf into the chacha key, chacha nonce, and hmac key. */ -static inline const struct nc_expand_keys* _expandKeysFromHkdf(const struct message_key* hkdf) +static _nc_fn_inline const struct nc_expand_keys* _expandKeysFromHkdf(const struct message_key* hkdf) { return (const struct nc_expand_keys*)hkdf; } -static int _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCCryptoData* args) +static cstatus_t _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCEncryptionArgs* args) { DEBUG_ASSERT2(keys != NULL, "Expected valid keys") DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args") - return mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( + return ncCryptoChacha20( keys->chacha_key, keys->chacha_nonce, - 0, /* Counter (always starts at 0) */ - args->dataSize, /* Data size (input and output are assumed to be the same size) */ args->inputData, /* Input data */ - args->outputData /* Output data */ + args->outputData, /* Output data */ + args->dataSize /* Data size (input and output are assumed to be the same size) */ ); } -static inline NCResult _getMessageKey( - const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo, +static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _getMessageKey( const struct conversation_key* converstationKey, - const uint8_t* nonce, - size_t nonceSize, + const cspan_t* nonce, struct message_key* messageKey ) { - int result; - DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdInfo != NULL, "Expected valid md context") + cspan_t prkSpan; + span_t okmSpan; + DEBUG_ASSERT2(nonce != NULL, "Expected valid nonce buffer") DEBUG_ASSERT2(converstationKey != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key") DEBUG_ASSERT2(messageKey != NULL, "Expected valid message key buffer") - /* Another HKDF to derive the message key with nonce */ - result = mbedtls_hkdf_expand( - mdInfo, - (uint8_t*)converstationKey, /* Conversation key is the input key */ - NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE, - nonce, - nonceSize, - (uint8_t*)messageKey, /* Output produces a message key (write it directly to struct memory) */ - NC_MESSAGE_KEY_SIZE - ); - - return result == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; + ncSpanInitC(&prkSpan, converstationKey->value, sizeof(struct conversation_key)); /* Conversation key is the input key */ + ncSpanInit(&okmSpan, messageKey->value, sizeof(struct message_key)); /* Output produces a message key (write it directly to struct memory) */ + + /* Nonce is the info */ + return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(&prkSpan, nonce, &okmSpan); } -static inline NCResult _encryptEx( +static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _encryptEx( const NCContext* ctx, - const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdINfo, const struct conversation_key* ck, - uint8_t hmacKey[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], - NCCryptoData* args + uint8_t* hmacKey, + NCEncryptionArgs* args ) { NCResult result; + cspan_t nonceSpan; struct message_key messageKey; const struct nc_expand_keys* expandedKeys; - DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdINfo != NULL, "Expected valid md info struct") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacKey != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key buffer") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacKey != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key buffer") - /* Failure, bail out */ - if ((result = _getMessageKey(mdINfo, ck, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, &messageKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + result = NC_SUCCESS; + + ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); + + /* Message key will be derrived on every encryption call */ + if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) { + result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; } - /* Expand the keys from the hkdf so we can use them in the cipher */ + /* Split apart the message key into it's expanded form so components can be extracted */ expandedKeys = _expandKeysFromHkdf(&messageKey); /* Copy the hmac key into the args */ MEMMOV(hmacKey, expandedKeys->hmac_key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE); /* CHACHA20 (the result will be 0 on success) */ - result = (NCResult)_chachaEncipher(expandedKeys, args); + if (_chachaEncipher(expandedKeys, args) != CSTATUS_OK) + { + result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; + } Cleanup: - /* Clean up sensitive data */ ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey)); return result; } -static inline NCResult _decryptEx( - const NCContext* ctx, - const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo, - const struct conversation_key* ck, - NCCryptoData* args -) +static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptEx(const NCContext* ctx, const struct conversation_key* ck, NCEncryptionArgs* args) { NCResult result; + cspan_t nonceSpan; struct message_key messageKey; const struct nc_expand_keys* cipherKeys; DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context") DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key") DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(mdInfo != NULL, "Expected valid md info struct") - /* Failure to get message keys, bail out */ - if ((result = _getMessageKey(mdInfo, ck, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, &messageKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + result = NC_SUCCESS; + + ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); + + if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) { + result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; } @@ -403,34 +346,28 @@ static inline NCResult _decryptEx( cipherKeys = _expandKeysFromHkdf(&messageKey); /* CHACHA20 (the result will be 0 on success) */ - result = (NCResult) _chachaEncipher(cipherKeys, args); + if (_chachaEncipher(cipherKeys, args) != CSTATUS_OK) + { + result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; + } Cleanup: - /* Clean up sensitive data */ ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey)); return result; } -static inline int _computeHmac( - const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], - const NCMacVerifyArgs* args, - uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE] -) +static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _computeHmac(const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], const cspan_t* payload, sha256_t hmacOut) { - DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut != NULL, "Expected valid hmac output buffer") - DEBUG_ASSERT(args->payload != NULL) - - return mbedtls_md_hmac( - _getSha256MdInfo(), - key, - NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE, - args->payload, - args->payloadSize, - hmacOut - ); + cspan_t keySpan; + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(payload != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut != NULL, "Expected valid hmac output buffer") + + ncSpanInitC(&keySpan, key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE); + + return ncCryptoHmacSha256(&keySpan, payload, hmacOut); } static NCResult _verifyMacEx( @@ -440,31 +377,25 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx( ) { NCResult result; - const mbedtls_md_info_t* sha256Info; + cspan_t payloadSpan, nonceSpan; + sha256_t hmacOut; const struct nc_expand_keys* keys; struct message_key messageKey; - uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE]; DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context") DEBUG_ASSERT2(conversationKey != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key") DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args") - sha256Info = _getSha256MdInfo(); + ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); + ncSpanInitC(&payloadSpan, args->payload, args->payloadSize); /* - * We need to get the message key in order to - * get the required hmac key + * Message key is again required for the hmac verification */ - result = _getMessageKey( - sha256Info, - (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, - args->nonce32, - NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, - &messageKey - ); - if (result != NC_SUCCESS) + if (_getMessageKey((struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) { + result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; } @@ -474,24 +405,22 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx( /* * Compute the hmac of the data using the computed hmac key */ - if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, args, hmacOut) != 0) + if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) != CSTATUS_OK) { result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; } /* constant time compare the macs */ - result = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hmacOut, args->mac32, NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE) == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; + result = ncCryptoFixedTimeComp(hmacOut, args->mac32, NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE) == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; Cleanup: - /* Clean up sensitive data */ ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey)); ZERO_FILL(hmacOut, sizeof(hmacOut)); return result; } - /* * EXTERNAL API FUNCTIONS */ @@ -502,7 +431,7 @@ NC_EXPORT uint32_t NC_CC NCGetContextStructSize(void) NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCInitContext( NCContext* ctx, - const uint8_t entropy[32] + const uint8_t entropy[NC_CONTEXT_ENTROPY_SIZE] ) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) @@ -510,18 +439,21 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCInitContext( ctx->secpCtx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); - /* Randomize once on init */ + /* + * Randomize once on init, users can call reinit to + * randomize again as needed. + */ return secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx->secpCtx, entropy) ? NC_SUCCESS : E_INVALID_ARG; } NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCReInitContext( NCContext* ctx, - const uint8_t entropy[32] + const uint8_t entropy[NC_CONTEXT_ENTROPY_SIZE] ) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(entropy, 1) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) /* Only randomize again */ return secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx->secpCtx, entropy) ? NC_SUCCESS : E_INVALID_ARG; @@ -529,8 +461,8 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCReInitContext( NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDestroyContext(NCContext* ctx) { - CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0); - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0); + CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) /* Destroy secp256k1 context */ secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx->secpCtx); @@ -553,7 +485,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetPublicKey( secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly; CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2) @@ -577,14 +509,11 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetPublicKey( return NC_SUCCESS; } -NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCValidateSecretKey( - const NCContext* ctx, - const NCSecretKey* sk -) +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCValidateSecretKey(const NCContext* ctx, const NCSecretKey* sk) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) /* Validate the secret key */ return secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sk->key); @@ -606,13 +535,13 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignDigest( /* Validate arguments */ CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(random32, 2) CHECK_NULL_ARG(digest32, 3) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 4) - /* Generate the keypair */ + /* Fill keypair structure from the callers secret key */ if (secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx->secpCtx, &keyPair, sk->key) != 1) { return E_INVALID_ARG; @@ -628,8 +557,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignDigest( /* Verify the signature is valid */ result = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sig64, digest32, 32, &xonly); - - /* cleanup any sensitive data */ + ZERO_FILL(&keyPair, sizeof(keyPair)); ZERO_FILL(&xonly, sizeof(xonly)); @@ -641,11 +569,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignData( const NCSecretKey* sk, const uint8_t random32[32], const uint8_t* data, - size_t dataSize, + uint32_t dataSize, uint8_t sig64[64] ) { - uint8_t digest[32]; + cspan_t dataSpan; + sha256_t digest; /* Double check is required because arg position differs */ CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) @@ -655,8 +584,10 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignData( CHECK_ARG_RANGE(dataSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 4) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 5) + ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize); + /* Compute sha256 of the data before signing */ - if(mbedtls_sha256(data, dataSize, digest, 0) != 0) + if(ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK) { return E_INVALID_ARG; } @@ -676,7 +607,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyDigest( secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly; CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(digest32, 2) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 3) @@ -689,8 +620,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyDigest( /* Verify the signature */ result = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sig64, digest32, 32, &xonly); - - /* cleanup any sensitive data */ + ZERO_FILL(&xonly, sizeof(xonly)); return result == 1 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_INVALID_ARG; @@ -700,11 +630,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyData( const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* pk, const uint8_t* data, - const size_t dataSize, + const uint32_t dataSize, const uint8_t sig64[64] ) { - uint8_t digest[32]; + sha256_t digest; + cspan_t dataSpan; CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 1) @@ -712,8 +643,10 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyData( CHECK_ARG_RANGE(dataSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 3) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 4) + ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize); + /* Compute sha256 of the data before verifying */ - if (mbedtls_sha256(data, dataSize, digest, 0) != 0) + if (ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK) { return E_INVALID_ARG; } @@ -732,17 +665,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetSharedSecret( ) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(otherPk, 2) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sharedPoint, 3) - return _computeSharedSecret( - ctx, - sk, - otherPk, - (struct shared_secret*)sharedPoint - ); + return _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, otherPk, (struct shared_secret*)sharedPoint); } NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKeyEx( @@ -752,14 +680,13 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKeyEx( ) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sharedPoint, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 2) /* Cast the shared point to the shared secret type */ return _computeConversationKey( - ctx, - _getSha256MdInfo(), + ctx, (struct shared_secret*)sharedPoint, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey ); @@ -776,7 +703,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKey( struct shared_secret sharedSecret; CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2) CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 3) @@ -787,12 +714,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKey( goto Cleanup; } - result = _computeConversationKey( - ctx, - _getSha256MdInfo(), - &sharedSecret, - (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey - ); + result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey); Cleanup: /* Clean up sensitive data */ @@ -804,72 +726,72 @@ Cleanup: NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncryptEx( const NCContext* ctx, const uint8_t conversationKey[NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE], - uint8_t hmacKeyOut[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], - NCCryptoData* args + NCEncryptionArgs* args ) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1) - CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKeyOut, 2) - CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3) + CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2) /* Validte ciphertext/plaintext */ - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3) - CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) - - return _encryptEx( - ctx, - _getSha256MdInfo(), - (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, - hmacKeyOut, - args - ); + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 2) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 2) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 2) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 2) + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 2) + + return _encryptEx(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args); } NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncrypt( const NCContext* ctx, const NCSecretKey* sk, - const NCPublicKey* pk, - uint8_t hmacKeyOut[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], - NCCryptoData* args + const NCPublicKey* pk, + NCEncryptionArgs* args ) { NCResult result; - const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo; struct shared_secret sharedSecret; struct conversation_key conversationKey; CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2) - CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKeyOut, 3) - CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 4) + CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3) /* Validate input/output data */ - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 4) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 4) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 4) - CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 4) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 3) + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) - mdInfo = _getSha256MdInfo(); + switch(args->version) + { + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + break; /* Allow nip44 */ + /* At the moment nip04 compatability is not supported */ + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04: + default: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + /* Compute the shared point */ if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS) { goto Cleanup; } - + /* Compute the conversation key from secret and pubkic keys */ - if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, mdInfo, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) { goto Cleanup; } - result = _encryptEx(ctx, mdInfo, &conversationKey, hmacKeyOut, args); + result = _encryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args); Cleanup: /* Clean up sensitive data */ @@ -882,11 +804,11 @@ Cleanup: NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecryptEx( const NCContext* ctx, const uint8_t conversationKey[NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE], - NCCryptoData* args + NCEncryptionArgs* args ) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2) @@ -896,28 +818,22 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecryptEx( CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 2) CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 2) - return _decryptEx( - ctx, - _getSha256MdInfo(), - (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, - args - ); + return _decryptEx(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args); } NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecrypt( const NCContext* ctx, const NCSecretKey* sk, const NCPublicKey* pk, - NCCryptoData* args + NCEncryptionArgs* args ) { NCResult result; struct shared_secret sharedSecret; struct conversation_key conversationKey; - const mbedtls_md_info_t* mdInfo; CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2) CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3) @@ -928,19 +844,17 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecrypt( CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3) CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) - mdInfo = _getSha256MdInfo(); - if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS) { goto Cleanup; } - if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, mdInfo, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) { goto Cleanup; } - result = _decryptEx(ctx, mdInfo, &conversationKey, args); + result = _decryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, args); Cleanup: /* Clean up sensitive data */ @@ -954,28 +868,25 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NCComputeMac( const NCContext* ctx, const uint8_t hmacKey[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], const uint8_t* payload, - size_t payloadSize, + uint32_t payloadSize, uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE] ) { - NCMacVerifyArgs args; + cspan_t payloadSpan; CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKey, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(payload, 2) CHECK_ARG_RANGE(payloadSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 3) CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacOut, 4) - /*Fill args with 0 before use because we are only using some of the properties*/ - ZERO_FILL(&args, sizeof(args)); - args.payload = payload; - args.payloadSize = payloadSize; + ncSpanInitC(&payloadSpan, payload, payloadSize); /* * Compute the hmac of the data using the supplied hmac key */ - return _computeHmac(hmacKey, &args, hmacOut) == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; + return _computeHmac(hmacKey, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; } @@ -986,7 +897,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMacEx( ) { CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2) @@ -1005,8 +916,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMac( NCMacVerifyArgs* args ) { + NCResult result; + struct shared_secret sharedSecret; + struct conversation_key conversationKey; + CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0) + CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0) CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1) CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2) CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3) @@ -1016,22 +931,18 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMac( CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3) CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->payloadSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) - NCResult result; - struct shared_secret sharedSecret; - struct conversation_key conversationKey; - /* Computed the shared point so we can get the converstation key */ if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS) { goto Cleanup; } - if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, _getSha256MdInfo(), &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) { goto Cleanup; } - result = _verifyMacEx(ctx, (uint8_t*)&conversationKey, args); + result = _verifyMacEx(ctx, conversationKey.value, args); Cleanup: /* Clean up sensitive data */ -- cgit