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authorLibravatar vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com>2024-04-23 14:48:05 -0400
committerLibravatar vnugent <public@vaughnnugent.com>2024-04-23 14:48:05 -0400
commit30e8dda6cbea86bdee6d5dfe48514385d3b9f81b (patch)
tree49a4e59a5e0bdf867e31168852d7299c6bb7c783 /src/noscrypt.c
parentd09c6c1bd5da3e2d79351daeba304ca99976a726 (diff)
refactor: Crypto dep redesign working on Windows
Diffstat (limited to 'src/noscrypt.c')
-rw-r--r--src/noscrypt.c244
1 files changed, 119 insertions, 125 deletions
diff --git a/src/noscrypt.c b/src/noscrypt.c
index 9271353..4715d50 100644
--- a/src/noscrypt.c
+++ b/src/noscrypt.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_INVALID_ARG, argPos);
#define CHECK_NULL_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_NULL_PTR, argPos);
#define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) if(x < min || x > max) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE, argPos);
+ #define CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, argPos) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, argPos)
#else
/* empty macros */
#define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x)
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ struct nc_expand_keys {
uint8_t hmac_key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE];
};
+
/* Pointer typecast must work between expanded keys
* and message key, size must be identical to work
*/
@@ -126,7 +128,11 @@ static int _convertToPubKey(const NCContext* ctx, const NCPublicKey* compressedP
return result;
}
-static _nc_fn_inline int _convertFromXonly(const NCContext* ctx, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly, NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey)
+static _nc_fn_inline int _convertFromXonly(
+ const NCContext* ctx,
+ const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey* xonly,
+ NCPublicKey* compressedPubKey
+)
{
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(xonly != NULL, "Expected valid X-only secp256k1 public key structure.")
@@ -214,23 +220,16 @@ static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _computeConversationKey(
struct conversation_key* ck
)
{
- int opResult;
+ cspan_t saltSpan, ikmSpan;
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(sharedSecret != NULL, "Expected a valid shared-point")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected a valid conversation key")
-
- /* Derive the encryption key */
- opResult = ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(
- Nip44ConstantSalt,
- sizeof(Nip44ConstantSalt),
- (uint8_t*)sharedSecret, /* Shared secret is the input key */
- NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE,
- (uint8_t*)ck /* Output produces a conversation key */
- );
- /* 0 is a successful hdkf result */
- return opResult == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ ncSpanInitC(&saltSpan, Nip44ConstantSalt, sizeof(Nip44ConstantSalt));
+ ncSpanInitC(&ikmSpan, sharedSecret->value, NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE);
+
+ return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(&saltSpan, &ikmSpan, ck->value) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
}
@@ -242,7 +241,7 @@ static _nc_fn_inline const struct nc_expand_keys* _expandKeysFromHkdf(const stru
return (const struct nc_expand_keys*)hkdf;
}
-static int _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCEncryptionArgs* args)
+static cstatus_t _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCEncryptionArgs* args)
{
DEBUG_ASSERT2(keys != NULL, "Expected valid keys")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
@@ -256,61 +255,65 @@ static int _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCEncryptionArgs*
);
}
-static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _getMessageKey(
+static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _getMessageKey(
const struct conversation_key* converstationKey,
- const uint8_t* nonce,
- size_t nonceSize,
+ const cspan_t* nonce,
struct message_key* messageKey
)
{
- int result;
+ cspan_t prkSpan;
+ span_t okmSpan;
+
DEBUG_ASSERT2(nonce != NULL, "Expected valid nonce buffer")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(converstationKey != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(messageKey != NULL, "Expected valid message key buffer")
- /* Another HKDF to derive the message key with nonce */
- result = ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(
- (uint8_t*)converstationKey, /* Conversation key is the input key */
- NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE,
- nonce,
- nonceSize,
- (uint8_t*)messageKey, /* Output produces a message key (write it directly to struct memory) */
- NC_MESSAGE_KEY_SIZE
- );
-
- return result == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ ncSpanInitC(&prkSpan, converstationKey->value, sizeof(struct conversation_key)); /* Conversation key is the input key */
+ ncSpanInit(&okmSpan, messageKey->value, sizeof(struct message_key)); /* Output produces a message key (write it directly to struct memory) */
+
+ /* Nonce is the info */
+ return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(&prkSpan, nonce, &okmSpan);
}
static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _encryptEx(
const NCContext* ctx,
const struct conversation_key* ck,
- uint8_t hmacKey[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
+ uint8_t* hmacKey,
NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
NCResult result;
+ cspan_t nonceSpan;
struct message_key messageKey;
const struct nc_expand_keys* expandedKeys;
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacKey != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key buffer")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacKey != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key buffer")
+
+ result = NC_SUCCESS;
+
+ ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE);
/* Message key will be derrived on every encryption call */
- if ((result = _getMessageKey(ck, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, &messageKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
+ if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
}
- /* Expand the keys from the hkdf so we can use them in the cipher */
+ /* Split apart the message key into it's expanded form so components can be extracted */
expandedKeys = _expandKeysFromHkdf(&messageKey);
/* Copy the hmac key into the args */
MEMMOV(hmacKey, expandedKeys->hmac_key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE);
/* CHACHA20 (the result will be 0 on success) */
- result = (NCResult)_chachaEncipher(expandedKeys, args);
+ if (_chachaEncipher(expandedKeys, args) != CSTATUS_OK)
+ {
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ }
Cleanup:
ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey));
@@ -318,22 +321,24 @@ Cleanup:
return result;
}
-static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptEx(
- const NCContext* ctx,
- const struct conversation_key* ck,
- NCEncryptionArgs* args
-)
+static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptEx(const NCContext* ctx, const struct conversation_key* ck, NCEncryptionArgs* args)
{
NCResult result;
+ cspan_t nonceSpan;
struct message_key messageKey;
const struct nc_expand_keys* cipherKeys;
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ck != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid encryption args")
+
+ result = NC_SUCCESS;
+
+ ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE);
- if ((result = _getMessageKey(ck, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, &messageKey)) != NC_SUCCESS)
+ if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
}
@@ -341,7 +346,10 @@ static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptEx(
cipherKeys = _expandKeysFromHkdf(&messageKey);
/* CHACHA20 (the result will be 0 on success) */
- result = (NCResult) _chachaEncipher(cipherKeys, args);
+ if (_chachaEncipher(cipherKeys, args) != CSTATUS_OK)
+ {
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ }
Cleanup:
ZERO_FILL(&messageKey, sizeof(messageKey));
@@ -349,22 +357,17 @@ Cleanup:
return result;
}
-static _nc_fn_inline int _computeHmac(
- const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
- const NCMacVerifyArgs* args,
- uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE]
-)
+static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _computeHmac(const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], const cspan_t* payload, sha256_t hmacOut)
{
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args")
- DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut != NULL, "Expected valid hmac output buffer")
- DEBUG_ASSERT(args->payload != NULL)
+ cspan_t keySpan;
- return ncCryptoHmacSha256(
- key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE,
- args->payload, args->payloadSize,
- hmacOut
- );
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(payload != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args")
+ DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut != NULL, "Expected valid hmac output buffer")
+
+ ncSpanInitC(&keySpan, key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ return ncCryptoHmacSha256(&keySpan, payload, hmacOut);
}
static NCResult _verifyMacEx(
@@ -374,26 +377,25 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx(
)
{
NCResult result;
+ cspan_t payloadSpan, nonceSpan;
+ sha256_t hmacOut;
const struct nc_expand_keys* keys;
struct message_key messageKey;
- uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE];
DEBUG_ASSERT2(ctx != NULL, "Expected valid context")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(conversationKey != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key")
DEBUG_ASSERT2(args != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args")
+ ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ncSpanInitC(&payloadSpan, args->payload, args->payloadSize);
+
/*
* Message key is again required for the hmac verification
*/
- result = _getMessageKey(
- (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey,
- args->nonce32,
- NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE,
- &messageKey
- );
- if (result != NC_SUCCESS)
+ if (_getMessageKey((struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
+ result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
}
@@ -403,7 +405,7 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx(
/*
* Compute the hmac of the data using the computed hmac key
*/
- if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, args, hmacOut) != 0)
+ if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
result = E_OPERATION_FAILED;
goto Cleanup;
@@ -419,7 +421,6 @@ Cleanup:
return result;
}
-
/*
* EXTERNAL API FUNCTIONS
*/
@@ -452,7 +453,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCReInitContext(
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(entropy, 1)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
/* Only randomize again */
return secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx->secpCtx, entropy) ? NC_SUCCESS : E_INVALID_ARG;
@@ -460,8 +461,8 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCReInitContext(
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDestroyContext(NCContext* ctx)
{
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0);
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0);
+ CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
/* Destroy secp256k1 context */
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx->secpCtx);
@@ -484,7 +485,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetPublicKey(
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
@@ -508,14 +509,11 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetPublicKey(
return NC_SUCCESS;
}
-NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCValidateSecretKey(
- const NCContext* ctx,
- const NCSecretKey* sk
-)
+NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCValidateSecretKey(const NCContext* ctx, const NCSecretKey* sk)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
/* Validate the secret key */
return secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sk->key);
@@ -537,7 +535,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignDigest(
/* Validate arguments */
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(random32, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(digest32, 3)
@@ -571,11 +569,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignData(
const NCSecretKey* sk,
const uint8_t random32[32],
const uint8_t* data,
- size_t dataSize,
+ uint64_t dataSize,
uint8_t sig64[64]
)
{
- uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ cspan_t dataSpan;
+ sha256_t digest;
/* Double check is required because arg position differs */
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
@@ -585,8 +584,10 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignData(
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(dataSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 4)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 5)
+ ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize);
+
/* Compute sha256 of the data before signing */
- if(ncCryptoDigestSha256(data, dataSize, digest) != 0)
+ if(ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
return E_INVALID_ARG;
}
@@ -606,7 +607,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyDigest(
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey xonly;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(digest32, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 3)
@@ -629,11 +630,12 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyData(
const NCContext* ctx,
const NCPublicKey* pk,
const uint8_t* data,
- const size_t dataSize,
+ const uint64_t dataSize,
const uint8_t sig64[64]
)
{
- uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ sha256_t digest;
+ cspan_t dataSpan;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 1)
@@ -641,8 +643,10 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyData(
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(dataSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 3)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sig64, 4)
+ ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize);
+
/* Compute sha256 of the data before verifying */
- if (ncCryptoDigestSha256(data, dataSize, digest) != 0)
+ if (ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK)
{
return E_INVALID_ARG;
}
@@ -661,7 +665,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetSharedSecret(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(otherPk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sharedPoint, 3)
@@ -676,7 +680,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKeyEx(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sharedPoint, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 2)
@@ -699,7 +703,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetConversationKey(
struct shared_secret sharedSecret;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 3)
@@ -722,35 +726,28 @@ Cleanup:
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncryptEx(
const NCContext* ctx,
const uint8_t conversationKey[NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE],
- uint8_t hmacKeyOut[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKeyOut, 2)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
+ CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2)
/* Validte ciphertext/plaintext */
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3)
- CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 2)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 2)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 2)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 2)
+ CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 2)
- return _encryptEx(
- ctx,
- (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey,
- hmacKeyOut,
- args
- );
+ return _encryptEx(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args);
}
NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncrypt(
const NCContext* ctx,
const NCSecretKey* sk,
- const NCPublicKey* pk,
- uint8_t hmacKeyOut[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
+ const NCPublicKey* pk,
NCEncryptionArgs* args
)
{
@@ -759,17 +756,17 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncrypt(
struct conversation_key conversationKey;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKeyOut, 3)
- CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 4)
+ CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
/* Validate input/output data */
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 4)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 4)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 4)
- CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 4)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3)
+ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 3)
+ CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3)
/* Compute the shared point */
if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS)
@@ -783,7 +780,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncrypt(
goto Cleanup;
}
- result = _encryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, hmacKeyOut, args);
+ result = _encryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args);
Cleanup:
/* Clean up sensitive data */
@@ -800,7 +797,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecryptEx(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2)
@@ -825,7 +822,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecrypt(
struct conversation_key conversationKey;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
@@ -860,28 +857,25 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NCComputeMac(
const NCContext* ctx,
const uint8_t hmacKey[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
const uint8_t* payload,
- size_t payloadSize,
+ uint64_t payloadSize,
uint8_t hmacOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE]
)
{
- NCMacVerifyArgs args;
+ cspan_t payloadSpan;
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacKey, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(payload, 2)
CHECK_ARG_RANGE(payloadSize, 1, UINT32_MAX, 3)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(hmacOut, 4)
- /*Fill args with 0 before use because we are only using some of the properties*/
- ZERO_FILL(&args, sizeof(args));
- args.payload = payload;
- args.payloadSize = payloadSize;
+ ncSpanInitC(&payloadSpan, payload, payloadSize);
/*
* Compute the hmac of the data using the supplied hmac key
*/
- return _computeHmac(hmacKey, &args, hmacOut) == 0 ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
+ return _computeHmac(hmacKey, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED;
}
@@ -892,7 +886,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMacEx(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(conversationKey, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 2)
@@ -912,7 +906,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMac(
)
{
CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0)
- CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, 0)
+ CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, 0)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 1)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 2)
CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 3)
@@ -937,7 +931,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyMac(
goto Cleanup;
}
- result = _verifyMacEx(ctx, (uint8_t*)&conversationKey, args);
+ result = _verifyMacEx(ctx, conversationKey.value, args);
Cleanup:
/* Clean up sensitive data */