From 30e8dda6cbea86bdee6d5dfe48514385d3b9f81b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vnugent Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2024 14:48:05 -0400 Subject: refactor: Crypto dep redesign working on Windows --- vendor/monocypher/monocypher.h | 321 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 321 insertions(+) create mode 100644 vendor/monocypher/monocypher.h (limited to 'vendor/monocypher/monocypher.h') diff --git a/vendor/monocypher/monocypher.h b/vendor/monocypher/monocypher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf635e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/monocypher/monocypher.h @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +// Monocypher version __git__ +// +// This file is dual-licensed. Choose whichever licence you want from +// the two licences listed below. +// +// The first licence is a regular 2-clause BSD licence. The second licence +// is the CC-0 from Creative Commons. It is intended to release Monocypher +// to the public domain. The BSD licence serves as a fallback option. +// +// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause OR CC0-1.0 +// +// ------------------------------------------------------------------------ +// +// Copyright (c) 2017-2019, Loup Vaillant +// All rights reserved. +// +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are +// met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +// documentation and/or other materials provided with the +// distribution. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +// HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +// +// ------------------------------------------------------------------------ +// +// Written in 2017-2019 by Loup Vaillant +// +// To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright +// and related neighboring rights to this software to the public domain +// worldwide. This software is distributed without any warranty. +// +// You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along +// with this software. If not, see +// + +#ifndef MONOCYPHER_H +#define MONOCYPHER_H + +#include +#include + +#ifdef MONOCYPHER_CPP_NAMESPACE +namespace MONOCYPHER_CPP_NAMESPACE { +#elif defined(__cplusplus) +extern "C" { +#endif + +// Constant time comparisons +// ------------------------- + +// Return 0 if a and b are equal, -1 otherwise +int crypto_verify16(const uint8_t a[16], const uint8_t b[16]); +int crypto_verify32(const uint8_t a[32], const uint8_t b[32]); +int crypto_verify64(const uint8_t a[64], const uint8_t b[64]); + + +// Erase sensitive data +// -------------------- +void crypto_wipe(void *secret, size_t size); + + +// Authenticated encryption +// ------------------------ +void crypto_aead_lock(uint8_t *cipher_text, + uint8_t mac [16], + const uint8_t key [32], + const uint8_t nonce[24], + const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_size, + const uint8_t *plain_text, size_t text_size); +int crypto_aead_unlock(uint8_t *plain_text, + const uint8_t mac [16], + const uint8_t key [32], + const uint8_t nonce[24], + const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_size, + const uint8_t *cipher_text, size_t text_size); + +// Authenticated stream +// -------------------- +typedef struct { + uint64_t counter; + uint8_t key[32]; + uint8_t nonce[8]; +} crypto_aead_ctx; + +void crypto_aead_init_x(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, + const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[24]); +void crypto_aead_init_djb(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, + const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[8]); +void crypto_aead_init_ietf(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, + const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[12]); + +void crypto_aead_write(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, + uint8_t *cipher_text, + uint8_t mac[16], + const uint8_t *ad , size_t ad_size, + const uint8_t *plain_text, size_t text_size); +int crypto_aead_read(crypto_aead_ctx *ctx, + uint8_t *plain_text, + const uint8_t mac[16], + const uint8_t *ad , size_t ad_size, + const uint8_t *cipher_text, size_t text_size); + + +// General purpose hash (BLAKE2b) +// ------------------------------ + +// Direct interface +void crypto_blake2b(uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, + const uint8_t *message, size_t message_size); + +void crypto_blake2b_keyed(uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, + const uint8_t *message, size_t message_size); + +// Incremental interface +typedef struct { + // Do not rely on the size or contents of this type, + // for they may change without notice. + uint64_t hash[8]; + uint64_t input_offset[2]; + uint64_t input[16]; + size_t input_idx; + size_t hash_size; +} crypto_blake2b_ctx; + +void crypto_blake2b_init(crypto_blake2b_ctx *ctx, size_t hash_size); +void crypto_blake2b_keyed_init(crypto_blake2b_ctx *ctx, size_t hash_size, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size); +void crypto_blake2b_update(crypto_blake2b_ctx *ctx, + const uint8_t *message, size_t message_size); +void crypto_blake2b_final(crypto_blake2b_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *hash); + + +// Password key derivation (Argon2) +// -------------------------------- +#define CRYPTO_ARGON2_D 0 +#define CRYPTO_ARGON2_I 1 +#define CRYPTO_ARGON2_ID 2 + +typedef struct { + uint32_t algorithm; // Argon2d, Argon2i, Argon2id + uint32_t nb_blocks; // memory hardness, >= 8 * nb_lanes + uint32_t nb_passes; // CPU hardness, >= 1 (>= 3 recommended for Argon2i) + uint32_t nb_lanes; // parallelism level (single threaded anyway) +} crypto_argon2_config; + +typedef struct { + const uint8_t *pass; + const uint8_t *salt; + uint32_t pass_size; + uint32_t salt_size; // 16 bytes recommended +} crypto_argon2_inputs; + +typedef struct { + const uint8_t *key; // may be NULL if no key + const uint8_t *ad; // may be NULL if no additional data + uint32_t key_size; // 0 if no key (32 bytes recommended otherwise) + uint32_t ad_size; // 0 if no additional data +} crypto_argon2_extras; + +extern const crypto_argon2_extras crypto_argon2_no_extras; + +void crypto_argon2(uint8_t *hash, uint32_t hash_size, void *work_area, + crypto_argon2_config config, + crypto_argon2_inputs inputs, + crypto_argon2_extras extras); + + +// Key exchange (X-25519) +// ---------------------- + +// Shared secrets are not quite random. +// Hash them to derive an actual shared key. +void crypto_x25519_public_key(uint8_t public_key[32], + const uint8_t secret_key[32]); +void crypto_x25519(uint8_t raw_shared_secret[32], + const uint8_t your_secret_key [32], + const uint8_t their_public_key [32]); + +// Conversion to EdDSA +void crypto_x25519_to_eddsa(uint8_t eddsa[32], const uint8_t x25519[32]); + +// scalar "division" +// Used for OPRF. Be aware that exponential blinding is less secure +// than Diffie-Hellman key exchange. +void crypto_x25519_inverse(uint8_t blind_salt [32], + const uint8_t private_key[32], + const uint8_t curve_point[32]); + +// "Dirty" versions of x25519_public_key(). +// Use with crypto_elligator_rev(). +// Leaks 3 bits of the private key. +void crypto_x25519_dirty_small(uint8_t pk[32], const uint8_t sk[32]); +void crypto_x25519_dirty_fast (uint8_t pk[32], const uint8_t sk[32]); + + +// Signatures +// ---------- + +// EdDSA with curve25519 + BLAKE2b +void crypto_eddsa_key_pair(uint8_t secret_key[64], + uint8_t public_key[32], + uint8_t seed[32]); +void crypto_eddsa_sign(uint8_t signature [64], + const uint8_t secret_key[64], + const uint8_t *message, size_t message_size); +int crypto_eddsa_check(const uint8_t signature [64], + const uint8_t public_key[32], + const uint8_t *message, size_t message_size); + +// Conversion to X25519 +void crypto_eddsa_to_x25519(uint8_t x25519[32], const uint8_t eddsa[32]); + +// EdDSA building blocks +void crypto_eddsa_trim_scalar(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t in[32]); +void crypto_eddsa_reduce(uint8_t reduced[32], const uint8_t expanded[64]); +void crypto_eddsa_mul_add(uint8_t r[32], + const uint8_t a[32], + const uint8_t b[32], + const uint8_t c[32]); +void crypto_eddsa_scalarbase(uint8_t point[32], const uint8_t scalar[32]); +int crypto_eddsa_check_equation(const uint8_t signature[64], + const uint8_t public_key[32], + const uint8_t h_ram[32]); + + +// Chacha20 +// -------- + +// Specialised hash. +// Used to hash X25519 shared secrets. +void crypto_chacha20_h(uint8_t out[32], + const uint8_t key[32], + const uint8_t in [16]); + +// Unauthenticated stream cipher. +// Don't forget to add authentication. +uint64_t crypto_chacha20_djb(uint8_t *cipher_text, + const uint8_t *plain_text, + size_t text_size, + const uint8_t key[32], + const uint8_t nonce[8], + uint64_t ctr); +uint32_t crypto_chacha20_ietf(uint8_t *cipher_text, + const uint8_t *plain_text, + size_t text_size, + const uint8_t key[32], + const uint8_t nonce[12], + uint32_t ctr); +uint64_t crypto_chacha20_x(uint8_t *cipher_text, + const uint8_t *plain_text, + size_t text_size, + const uint8_t key[32], + const uint8_t nonce[24], + uint64_t ctr); + + +// Poly 1305 +// --------- + +// This is a *one time* authenticator. +// Disclosing the mac reveals the key. +// See crypto_lock() on how to use it properly. + +// Direct interface +void crypto_poly1305(uint8_t mac[16], + const uint8_t *message, size_t message_size, + const uint8_t key[32]); + +// Incremental interface +typedef struct { + // Do not rely on the size or contents of this type, + // for they may change without notice. + uint8_t c[16]; // chunk of the message + size_t c_idx; // How many bytes are there in the chunk. + uint32_t r [4]; // constant multiplier (from the secret key) + uint32_t pad[4]; // random number added at the end (from the secret key) + uint32_t h [5]; // accumulated hash +} crypto_poly1305_ctx; + +void crypto_poly1305_init (crypto_poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[32]); +void crypto_poly1305_update(crypto_poly1305_ctx *ctx, + const uint8_t *message, size_t message_size); +void crypto_poly1305_final (crypto_poly1305_ctx *ctx, uint8_t mac[16]); + + +// Elligator 2 +// ----------- + +// Elligator mappings proper +void crypto_elligator_map(uint8_t curve [32], const uint8_t hidden[32]); +int crypto_elligator_rev(uint8_t hidden[32], const uint8_t curve [32], + uint8_t tweak); + +// Easy to use key pair generation +void crypto_elligator_key_pair(uint8_t hidden[32], uint8_t secret_key[32], + uint8_t seed[32]); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif // MONOCYPHER_H -- cgit