From 6fdc4bc32ccf653734cccb6e09690cb2973af6d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vnugent Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2024 20:56:36 -0400 Subject: Squashed commit of the following: commit 942aed8a4e7c173a2c9423829c2b38087cbd49e4 Author: vnugent Date: Tue Aug 6 20:54:03 2024 -0400 chore: update changelog and mbedtls headers commit 3b97f84fd0477eafcd6567eb8597b213e4136664 Author: vnugent Date: Tue Aug 6 19:57:10 2024 -0400 update libsecp256k1 to v0.5.1 commit 7989a2660997b909e0b99fc1dfb3bcfbb0528df3 Author: vnugent Date: Tue Aug 6 19:42:25 2024 -0400 update openssl to 3.3.1 commit e949ae5aa1fd25d4d11fe31e30b7d82ae7778dc2 Author: vnugent Date: Mon Aug 5 18:01:03 2024 -0400 fix: Find and fix openssl encryption bug commit a60a3e1ca1d99d655c0cfc96e3952c371e8a8677 Author: vnugent Date: Sun Aug 4 15:27:06 2024 -0400 cleanup comments + return codes commit 2aa7f4b6cdb2e0e8990e7177476f4104fd2e2b17 Author: vnugent Date: Sat Jul 27 22:20:53 2024 -0400 fix codeberg url commit 1640f79776c6b291b49a39a6128c05888fc4153e Author: vnugent Date: Sat Jul 27 00:05:07 2024 -0400 fix: Potential overflow in nip44 padding calculation commit 07de078a3b5b7b0043d9f81bb5a9e750a3a0c7c1 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Jul 26 23:37:15 2024 -0400 refactor: Span invasion, checks and fix some evp api commit 54f520e4bfc0fe23e2719d44b09739aa8709451c Author: vnugent Date: Tue Jul 23 19:55:13 2024 -0400 latest changes commit 12feb33dba2061415d6f39fa59dec16fafcda2a0 Author: vnugent Date: Sun Jul 21 17:51:04 2024 -0400 Push latest changes, patches, and internal upgrades commit ffe42b6858f112a00405be4f0605ab1163063749 Author: vnugent Date: Sat Jul 13 22:13:13 2024 -0400 test: Add decryption test cases and fixes commit 5dfafbc5a9214587533ec8b1dae2a962118d3650 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Jul 12 22:14:00 2024 -0400 feat: add decryption functionality to public api commit 8df8c5aed4ac626171b451b5422c3b207e88000b Author: vnugent Date: Thu Jul 11 21:39:39 2024 -0400 feat: Update sidecar utils library commit 23fe6e8c8596333c2183f0f4389817087442c551 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Jul 5 00:03:48 2024 -0400 push latest utils and changes commit dc71f861df8929deee300368b88ef47d45560695 Author: vnugent Date: Mon Jul 1 15:05:34 2024 -0400 fix: #7 fix confusing inline functions commit 90166048046d2511f0bb74f8880180e82466d4c0 Author: vnugent Date: Tue Jun 18 21:22:37 2024 -0400 push pending changes commit 461dd71069d0c0250752ac1256160605c33a6243 Author: vnugent Date: Tue Jun 11 15:44:28 2024 -0400 feat!: #4 Close #4. Add public nip04 support to api commit a74f96251bcc81fb2c94fe75dd6f8043fd35fe0b Merge: 1c26ef8 51d0aff Author: vnugent Date: Wed May 29 13:37:00 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 1c26ef86a04690120f4f752c7c5018a570ec5880 Author: vnugent Date: Wed May 29 13:34:20 2024 -0400 missed extra argument commit 88c9095743a12cf8fc1793c607ba3a1e4fa86483 Author: vnugent Date: Wed May 29 13:25:51 2024 -0400 refactor!: return NC_SUCCESS when validating secret key commit 718be80a4810b9352de7eb0707da54020aa6b649 Author: vnugent Date: Mon May 27 14:52:41 2024 -0400 fix: Properly build mbedtls & cmake fixes commit a8a6efb2319f739e5faae550561dc27d9dd1e88d Author: vnugent Date: Sun May 26 17:39:40 2024 -0400 chore: Update libs, reorder files, internalize private headers commit 72e1b7be4031e2fd4d258fcf434ad049c0029201 Author: vnugent Date: Sun May 26 13:39:08 2024 -0400 fix: Add c++ extern prototypes in noscrypt.h commit aeaac8d328b75911541be64d6f09d58fca294a08 Author: vnugent Date: Sun May 26 11:47:17 2024 -0400 refactor: Dep update, openssl chacha20 added commit 86b02540cce6015cfe4a2a56499a9a2f45d4e368 Author: vnugent Date: Sat May 18 12:24:17 2024 -0400 refactor: Remove NCContext structure definition commit d09d9330415d463ca19be9394b02ce11b3366f7e Author: vnugent Date: Mon May 13 22:33:50 2024 -0400 fix: update mbedtls inline issue includes commit 7838cb4bb15d4f453f92f56ece75e2b03986fe42 Author: vnugent Date: Mon May 13 22:29:16 2024 -0400 fix: force fPIC for secp256k1 targets commit d76f7708bc6ae81a638ca708230ac9153ac754e2 Merge: aa8033d a526139 Author: vnugent Date: Sun May 12 00:37:01 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit aa8033d4dbfebeb72b6fd7a0cd218ebde0eb54dd Author: vnugent Date: Sun May 12 00:34:20 2024 -0400 Final overview and test before tag commit 4e3ead2cf1d3068e77f0959dfdc17e20e9102a0f Merge: 2cee801 872c49d Author: vnugent Date: Mon May 6 22:08:09 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 2cee801979bfbcb3b0e53f592ce8c779b57cb679 Author: vnugent Date: Mon May 6 22:02:39 2024 -0400 Ensure static and dynamic libs get same args commit f533694023133552d0d42933d779c95a5854343f Author: vnugent Date: Mon May 6 21:50:29 2024 -0400 feat: CMake install & fetch-content test & updates commit 940ff20348b13d0bc30d9e9f4289dd6de20b16ba Author: vnugent Date: Sun May 5 14:07:28 2024 -0400 codeberg readonly push commit b34ed055c0b7d143561ce8798e0a95313b9224bd Merge: 0a40e20 e737556 Author: vnugent Date: Sat May 4 14:06:45 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 0a40e209d03e8ff9b6f81cd5969d3e845c633bfc Author: vnugent Date: Sat May 4 13:55:19 2024 -0400 ci: Force disable testing for win ci builds commit 55fae189fffc86f07a3448370f0a746670819712 Author: vnugent Date: Thu May 2 21:54:35 2024 -0400 feat: Working and tested openssl impl & defaults commit 6ff8bb11774c51fd341b7699a3938fd894995fbf Author: vnugent Date: Thu Apr 25 17:45:42 2024 -0400 refactor: Finish support and testing for mbedtls commit 7cb7a93de4f6f5e741bc5129e3d928e44f050930 Author: vnugent Date: Tue Apr 23 18:19:31 2024 -0400 refactor!: MbedTLS on Windows, switch to uint32 commit 30e8dda6cbea86bdee6d5dfe48514385d3b9f81b Author: vnugent Date: Tue Apr 23 14:48:05 2024 -0400 refactor: Crypto dep redesign working on Windows commit d09c6c1bd5da3e2d79351daeba304ca99976a726 Author: vnugent Date: Thu Apr 18 00:28:51 2024 -0400 refactor!: Pushing what I have to dev commit 54e06ada7d624ed0d28c6a6db04a149708841bf8 Author: vnugent Date: Sat Apr 13 01:24:00 2024 -0400 fix: convert constants to hex, inline macro, ParseErrorCode commit 4215e3100d9a0d23119080d09638fa5b60d0c6d4 Merge: d3328f4 7485aa5 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Apr 3 18:26:30 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit d3328f4152b22b28f24c43dda62464287f1efff5 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Apr 3 18:22:56 2024 -0400 build: Included dependency and versions in client builds commit b11bc0bac955fd5c6db65f0da48456bf5e748805 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Apr 3 18:10:08 2024 -0400 fix: Fix c89 compatabilty comments and struct assignment commit 9915bd41799a72413e6b400e150aa9f5fa797e25 Merge: 8e3d6ea 5184d7d Author: vnugent Date: Sat Mar 30 09:57:30 2024 -0400 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 8e3d6ea5e3c83fe42cb904b6ccc4fe2b73f76aae Author: vnugent Date: Sat Mar 30 09:52:55 2024 -0400 refactor!: Some api (struct) changes and updated tests commit e88e8420520204e20802516f01d4488bb0b1d6ea Merge: 490dfee 21f6c0a Author: vnugent Date: Sun Mar 3 15:02:34 2024 -0500 Merge branch 'master' into develop commit 490dfee4ef22479009627435c6ad728c3cbbab54 Author: vnugent Date: Sun Mar 3 14:59:25 2024 -0500 test: #3 tests for encryption/description and Macs commit efa97490b7ed47f4e2f05bee52e2b33e14e439e6 Merge: 1b84e3c 120022a Author: vnugent Date: Sun Mar 3 14:55:48 2024 -0500 merge master commit 1b84e3c7c2e55b1ff9ffdd09b66873e11c131441 Author: vnugent Date: Sat Mar 2 22:57:36 2024 -0500 fix: #2 constent usage of sizeof() operator on struct types commit 9de5a214c66adea0ef2d0bac63c59449de202a88 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Mar 1 14:30:36 2024 -0500 perf: avoid nc_key struct copy, cast and verify instead commit b917b761120ed684af28d0707673ffadcf14b8fe Author: vnugent Date: Mon Feb 12 22:06:50 2024 -0500 fix: found the constant time memcompare function commit 9f85fff3b9f25da7410569ea94f994b88feb3910 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Feb 9 22:48:35 2024 -0500 feat: added/update MAC functions to sign or verify nip44 payload commit aa5113741bb419b02d6ea416bba571fa3d65db46 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Feb 7 01:37:53 2024 -0500 add missing hmac-key output buffer commit 55f47d22cc9ce4d1e22b70814d608c7ef3b1bbc9 Author: vnugent Date: Sun Feb 4 21:08:13 2024 -0500 simple bug fixes, and public api argument validation tests commit 73c5a713fb164ae8b4ac8a891a8020e08eae0a3b Author: vnugent Date: Fri Feb 2 23:05:48 2024 -0500 update api to return secpvalidate return code instead of internal return codes commit 06c73004e1a39a7ea4ea3a89c22dee0f66adb236 Author: vnugent Date: Fri Feb 2 19:25:17 2024 -0500 change to lgpl license commit 6e79fdb3b6b6739fc7797d47e55a7691306cf736 Author: vnugent Date: Wed Jan 31 21:30:49 2024 -0500 move validation macros, and optionally disable them commit ac1e58837f1ba687939f78b5c03cadd346c10ddd Author: vnugent Date: Tue Jan 30 12:25:05 2024 -0500 couple more tests, renable range checks, set flags for all projects --- src/hkdf.c | 45 +-- src/hkdf.h | 8 +- src/nc-crypto.c | 83 +++-- src/nc-crypto.h | 18 +- src/nc-util.h | 174 +++++++++ src/noscrypt.c | 328 +++++++++++++--- src/noscryptutil.c | 910 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/providers/bcrypt.c | 33 +- src/providers/mbedtls.c | 44 +-- src/providers/monocypher.c | 2 +- src/providers/openssl.c | 281 +++++++++++--- 11 files changed, 1716 insertions(+), 210 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/noscryptutil.c (limited to 'src') diff --git a/src/hkdf.c b/src/hkdf.c index 0d91d14..7b0b822 100644 --- a/src/hkdf.c +++ b/src/hkdf.c @@ -21,23 +21,10 @@ #include "hkdf.h" -/* Include string for memmove */ -#include - #define HKDF_MIN(a, b) (a < b ? a : b) STATIC_ASSERT(HKDF_IN_BUF_SIZE > SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, "HDK Buffer must be at least the size of the underlying hashing alg output") -static _nc_fn_inline void ncWriteSpanS(span_t* span, uint32_t offset, const uint8_t* data, uint32_t size) -{ - DEBUG_ASSERT2(span != NULL, "Expected span to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(data != NULL, "Expected data to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(offset + size <= span->size, "Expected offset + size to be less than span size") - - /* Copy data to span */ - memmove(span->data + offset, data, size); -} - static _nc_fn_inline void debugValidateHandler(const struct nc_hkdf_fn_cb_struct* handler) { DEBUG_ASSERT(handler != NULL) @@ -55,16 +42,15 @@ static _nc_fn_inline void debugValidateHandler(const struct nc_hkdf_fn_cb_struct cstatus_t hkdfExpandProcess( const struct nc_hkdf_fn_cb_struct* handler, void* ctx, - const cspan_t* info, - span_t* okm + cspan_t info, + span_t okm ) { cstatus_t result; - - uint8_t counter; + cspan_t tSpan, counterSpan; uint32_t tLen, okmOffset; + uint8_t counter[1]; uint8_t t[HKDF_IN_BUF_SIZE]; - cspan_t tSpan, counterSpan; debugValidateHandler(handler); @@ -72,18 +58,18 @@ cstatus_t hkdfExpandProcess( tLen = 0; /* T(0) is an empty string(zero length) */ okmOffset = 0; - counter = 1; /* counter is offset by 1 for init */ + counter[0] = 1; /* counter is offset by 1 for init */ result = CSTATUS_FAIL; /* Start in fail state */ - /* counter as a span */ - ncSpanInitC(&counterSpan, &counter, sizeof(counter)); + /* span over counter value that points to the counter buffer */ + ncSpanInitC(&counterSpan, counter, sizeof(counter)); /* Compute T(N) = HMAC(prk, T(n-1) | info | n) */ - while (okmOffset < okm->size) + while (okmOffset < okm.size) { ncSpanInitC(&tSpan, t, tLen); - if (handler->update(ctx, &tSpan) != CSTATUS_OK) + if (handler->update(ctx, tSpan) != CSTATUS_OK) { goto Exit; } @@ -93,7 +79,7 @@ cstatus_t hkdfExpandProcess( goto Exit; } - if (handler->update(ctx, &counterSpan) != CSTATUS_OK) + if (handler->update(ctx, counterSpan) != CSTATUS_OK) { goto Exit; } @@ -109,18 +95,15 @@ cstatus_t hkdfExpandProcess( } /* tlen becomes the hash size or remaining okm size */ - tLen = HKDF_MIN(okm->size - okmOffset, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tLen = HKDF_MIN(ncSpanGetSize(okm) - okmOffset, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); DEBUG_ASSERT(tLen <= sizeof(t)); - /* write the T buffer back to okm */ - ncWriteSpanS(okm, okmOffset, t, tLen); - - /* shift base okm pointer by T */ - okmOffset += tLen; + /* write the T buffer back to okm and advance okmOffset by tLen */ + ncSpanAppend(okm, &okmOffset, t, tLen); /* increment counter */ - counter++; + (*counter)++; } result = CSTATUS_OK; /* HMAC operation completed, so set success */ diff --git a/src/hkdf.h b/src/hkdf.h index 460e203..50ee6e8 100644 --- a/src/hkdf.h +++ b/src/hkdf.h @@ -42,20 +42,20 @@ /* typedefs for hdkf callback functions */ -typedef cstatus_t (*hmac_hash_func)(void* ctx, const cspan_t* data); +typedef cstatus_t (*hmac_hash_fn)(void* ctx, cspan_t data); typedef cstatus_t (*hmac_finish_fn)(void* ctx, sha256_t hmacOut32); struct nc_hkdf_fn_cb_struct { - hmac_hash_func update; + hmac_hash_fn update; hmac_finish_fn finish; }; cstatus_t hkdfExpandProcess( const struct nc_hkdf_fn_cb_struct* handler, void* ctx, - const cspan_t* info, - span_t* okm + cspan_t info, + span_t okm ); #endif /* !_NC_HKDF_H */ diff --git a/src/nc-crypto.c b/src/nc-crypto.c index 97b59cb..56bdf75 100644 --- a/src/nc-crypto.c +++ b/src/nc-crypto.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ * _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_DIGEST standard sha256 digest function * _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXPAND hkdf expand function * _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXTRACT hkdf extract function +* _IMPL_AES256_CBC_CRYPT performs an AES 256 CBC encryption/decryption * * Macros are used to allow the preprocessor to select the correct implementation * or raise errors if no implementation is defined. @@ -49,6 +50,26 @@ * calling function, and should return CSTATUS_OK on success, CSTATUS_FAIL on failure. */ +#define UNREFPARAM(x) (void)(x) + +_IMPLSTB cstatus_t _dummyAesFunc( + const uint8_t key[32], + const uint8_t iv[16], + const uint8_t* input, + uint8_t* output, + uint32_t dataSize +) +{ + UNREFPARAM(key); + UNREFPARAM(iv); + UNREFPARAM(input); + UNREFPARAM(output); + UNREFPARAM(dataSize); + + return CSTATUS_FAIL; +} + +#define _IMPL_AES256_CBC_CRYPT _dummyAesFunc /* * Prioritize embedded builds with mbedtls @@ -113,7 +134,7 @@ #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXTRACT _fallbackHkdfExtract - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _fallbackHkdfExtract(const cspan_t* salt, const cspan_t* ikm, sha256_t prk) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _fallbackHkdfExtract(cspan_t salt, cspan_t ikm, sha256_t prk) { return _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HMAC(salt, ikm, prk); } @@ -196,11 +217,11 @@ uint32_t ncCryptoFixedTimeComp(const uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b, uint32_t size return _IMPL_CRYPTO_FIXED_TIME_COMPARE(a, b, size); } -cstatus_t ncCryptoDigestSha256(const cspan_t* data, sha256_t digestOut32) +cstatus_t ncCryptoDigestSha256(cspan_t data, sha256_t digestOut32) { /* Debug arg validate */ - DEBUG_ASSERT2(data != NULL && data->data != NULL, "Expected data to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(digestOut32 != NULL, "Expected digestOut32 to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(data), "Expected data to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(digestOut32 != NULL, "Expected digestOut32 to be non-null") #ifndef _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_DIGEST #error "No SHA256 implementation defined" @@ -209,12 +230,12 @@ cstatus_t ncCryptoDigestSha256(const cspan_t* data, sha256_t digestOut32) return _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_DIGEST(data, digestOut32); } -cstatus_t ncCryptoHmacSha256(const cspan_t* key, const cspan_t* data, sha256_t hmacOut32) +cstatus_t ncCryptoHmacSha256(cspan_t key, cspan_t data, sha256_t hmacOut32) { /* Debug arg validate */ - DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL && key->data != NULL, "Expected key to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(data != NULL && data->data != NULL, "Expected data to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut32 != NULL && data->data != NULL, "Expected hmacOut32 to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(key), "Expected key to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(data), "Expected data to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut32 != NULL, "Expected hmacOut32 to be non-null") #ifndef _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HMAC #error "No SHA256 HMAC implementation defined" @@ -223,12 +244,12 @@ cstatus_t ncCryptoHmacSha256(const cspan_t* key, const cspan_t* data, sha256_t h return _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HMAC(key, data, hmacOut32); } -cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(const cspan_t* prk, const cspan_t* info, span_t* okm) +cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(cspan_t prk, cspan_t info, span_t okm) { /* Debug arg validate */ - DEBUG_ASSERT2(prk != NULL && prk->data != NULL, "Expected prk to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(info != NULL && info->data != NULL, "Expected info to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(okm != NULL && okm->data != NULL, "Expected okm to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(prk), "Expected prk to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(info), "Expected info to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValid(okm), "Expected okm to be non-null") /* * RFC 5869: 2.3 @@ -237,7 +258,7 @@ cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(const cspan_t* prk, const cspan_t* info, span * important as the counter is 1 byte, so it cannot overflow */ - if(okm->size > (uint32_t)(0xFFu * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) + if(okm.size > (uint32_t)(0xFFu * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) { return CSTATUS_FAIL; } @@ -249,12 +270,12 @@ cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(const cspan_t* prk, const cspan_t* info, span return _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXPAND(prk, info, okm); } -cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(const cspan_t* salt, const cspan_t* ikm, sha256_t prk) +cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(cspan_t salt, cspan_t ikm, sha256_t prk) { /* Debug arg validate */ - DEBUG_ASSERT2(salt != NULL, "Expected salt to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(ikm != NULL, "Expected ikm to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(prk != NULL, "Expected prk to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(salt), "Expected salt to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(ikm), "Expected ikm to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(prk != NULL, "Expected prk to be non-null") #ifndef _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXTRACT #error "No SHA256 HKDF extract implementation defined" @@ -271,10 +292,10 @@ cstatus_t ncCryptoChacha20( uint32_t dataSize ) { - DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected key to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(nonce != NULL, "Expected nonce to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(input != NULL, "Expected input to be non-null") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(output != NULL, "Expected output to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected key to be non-null"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(nonce != NULL, "Expected nonce to be non-null"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(input != NULL, "Expected input to be non-null"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(output != NULL, "Expected output to be non-null"); #ifndef _IMPL_CHACHA20_CRYPT #error "No chacha20 implementation defined" @@ -282,3 +303,23 @@ cstatus_t ncCryptoChacha20( return _IMPL_CHACHA20_CRYPT(key, nonce, input, output, dataSize); } + +cstatus_t ncAes256CBCEncrypt( + const uint8_t key[32], + const uint8_t iv[16], + const uint8_t* input, + uint8_t* output, + uint32_t dataSize +) +{ + DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected key to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(iv != NULL, "Expected iv to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(input != NULL, "Expected input to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(output != NULL, "Expected output to be non-null") + +#ifndef _IMPL_AES256_CBC_CRYPT + #error "No AES256 CBC encrypt implementation defined" +#endif /* !_IMPL_AES256_CBC_CRYPT */ + + return _IMPL_AES256_CBC_CRYPT(key, iv, input, output, dataSize); +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/nc-crypto.h b/src/nc-crypto.h index f04ebe0..a1545de 100644 --- a/src/nc-crypto.h +++ b/src/nc-crypto.h @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #define CHACHA_NONCE_SIZE 0x0cu /* Size of 12 is set by the cipher spec */ #define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 0x20u /* Size of 32 is set by the cipher spec */ #define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 0x20u /* Size of 32 is set by the cipher spec */ +#define AES_IV_SIZE 0x10u /* CBC IV size matches the AES block size of 128 */ +#define AES_KEY_SIZE 0x20u /* AES 256 key size */ typedef uint8_t cstatus_t; #define CSTATUS_OK ((cstatus_t)0x01u) @@ -40,13 +42,13 @@ uint32_t ncCryptoFixedTimeComp(const uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b, uint32_t size void ncCryptoSecureZero(void* ptr, uint32_t size); -cstatus_t ncCryptoDigestSha256(const cspan_t* data, sha256_t digestOut32); +cstatus_t ncCryptoDigestSha256(cspan_t data, sha256_t digestOut32); -cstatus_t ncCryptoHmacSha256(const cspan_t* key, const cspan_t* data, sha256_t hmacOut32); +cstatus_t ncCryptoHmacSha256(cspan_t key, cspan_t data, sha256_t hmacOut32); -cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(const cspan_t* prk, const cspan_t* info, span_t* okm); +cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(cspan_t prk, cspan_t info, span_t okm); -cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(const cspan_t* salt, const cspan_t* ikm, sha256_t prk); +cstatus_t ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(cspan_t salt, cspan_t ikm, sha256_t prk); cstatus_t ncCryptoChacha20( const uint8_t key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], @@ -56,4 +58,12 @@ cstatus_t ncCryptoChacha20( uint32_t dataSize ); +cstatus_t ncAes256CBCEncrypt( + const uint8_t key[32], + const uint8_t iv[16], + const uint8_t* input, + uint8_t* output, + uint32_t dataSize +); + #endif /* !_NC_CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/src/nc-util.h b/src/nc-util.h index dd319c7..a248578 100644 --- a/src/nc-util.h +++ b/src/nc-util.h @@ -68,6 +68,32 @@ #define _overflow_check(x) #endif +#ifdef NC_EXTREME_COMPAT + + void _nc_memmove(void* dst, const void* src, uint32_t size) + { + uint32_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) + { + ((uint8_t*)dst)[i] = ((uint8_t*)src)[i]; + } + } + + #define MEMMOV _nc_memmove + +#else + + /* Include string for memmove */ + #include + #define MEMMOV(dst, src, size) memmove(dst, src, size) + +#endif /* NC_EXTREME_COMPAT */ + +#ifndef EMPTY_SPANS + #define EMPTY_SPANS 1 +#endif + typedef struct memory_span_struct { uint8_t* data; @@ -80,6 +106,26 @@ typedef struct read_only_memory_span_struct uint32_t size; } cspan_t; +static _nc_fn_inline int ncSpanIsValid(span_t span) +{ + return span.data != NULL; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline int ncSpanIsValidC(cspan_t span) +{ + return span.data != NULL; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline int ncSpanIsValidRange(span_t span, uint32_t offset, uint32_t size) +{ + return ncSpanIsValid(span) && offset + size <= span.size; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline int ncSpanIsValidRangeC(cspan_t span, uint32_t offset, uint32_t size) +{ + return ncSpanIsValidC(span) && offset + size <= span.size; +} + static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanInitC(cspan_t* span, const uint8_t* data, uint32_t size) { span->data = data; @@ -92,4 +138,132 @@ static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanInit(span_t* span, uint8_t* data, uint32_t size) span->size = size; } +static _nc_fn_inline const uint8_t* ncSpanGetOffsetC(cspan_t span, uint32_t offset) +{ + +#if EMPTY_SPANS + + /* + * Allow passing null pointers for empty spans, if enabled, + * otherwise debug guards will catch empty spans + */ + if (span.size == 0 && offset == 0) + { + return NULL; + } + +#endif /* !EMPTY_SPANS */ + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(span), "Expected span to be non-null"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(offset < span.size, "Expected offset to be less than span size"); + + return span.data + offset; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline uint8_t* ncSpanGetOffset(span_t span, uint32_t offset) +{ + cspan_t cspan; + ncSpanInitC(&cspan, span.data, span.size); + return (uint8_t*)ncSpanGetOffsetC(cspan, offset); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline uint32_t ncSpanGetSizeC(cspan_t span) +{ + return ncSpanIsValidC(span) + ? span.size + : 0; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline uint32_t ncSpanGetSize(span_t span) +{ + return ncSpanIsValid(span) + ? span.size + : 0; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanWrite(span_t span, uint32_t offset, const uint8_t* data, uint32_t size) +{ + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValid(span), "Expected span to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(data != NULL, "Expected data to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(offset + size <= span.size, "Expected offset + size to be less than span size") + + /* Copy data to span */ + MEMMOV(span.data + offset, data, size); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanAppend(span_t span, uint32_t* offset, const uint8_t* data, uint32_t size) +{ + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValid(span), "Expected span to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(offset != NULL, "Expected offset to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(data != NULL, "Expected data to be non-null") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(*offset + size <= span.size, "Expected offset + size to be less than span size") + + /* Copy data to span */ + MEMMOV(span.data + *offset, data, size); + + /* Increment offset */ + *offset += size; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline span_t ncSpanSlice(span_t span, uint32_t offset, uint32_t size) +{ + span_t slice; + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValid(span), "Expected span to be non-null"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(offset + size <= span.size, "Expected offset + size to be less than span size") + + /* Initialize slice, offset input data by the specified offset */ + ncSpanInit(&slice, span.data + offset, size); + + return slice; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline cspan_t ncSpanSliceC(cspan_t span, uint32_t offset, uint32_t size) +{ + cspan_t slice; + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(span), "Expected span to be non-null"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(offset + size <= span.size, "Expected offset + size to be less than span size") + + /* Initialize slice, offset input data by the specified offset */ + ncSpanInitC(&slice, span.data + offset, size); + + return slice; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanCopyC(cspan_t src, span_t dest) +{ + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValidC(src), "Expected span to be non-null"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValid(dest), "Expected offset + size to be less than span size"); + DEBUG_ASSERT2(dest.size >= src.size, "Output buffer too small. Overrun detected"); + + /* Copy data to span */ + MEMMOV(dest.data, src.data, src.size); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanCopy(span_t src, span_t dest) +{ + cspan_t csrc; + + ncSpanInitC(&csrc, src.data, src.size); + ncSpanCopyC(csrc, dest); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanReadC(cspan_t src, uint8_t* dest, uint32_t size) +{ + span_t dsts; + + ncSpanInit(&dsts, dest, size); + ncSpanCopyC(src, dsts); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void ncSpanRead(span_t src, uint8_t* dest, uint32_t size) +{ + cspan_t srcs; + + ncSpanInitC(&srcs, src.data, src.size); + ncSpanReadC(srcs, dest, size); +} + + #endif /* !_NC_UTIL_H */ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/noscrypt.c b/src/noscrypt.c index f1aabd4..deadca6 100644 --- a/src/noscrypt.c +++ b/src/noscrypt.c @@ -32,10 +32,6 @@ */ #define ZERO_FILL(x, size) ncCryptoSecureZero(x, size) -/* Include string for memmove */ -#include -#define MEMMOV(dst, src, size) memmove(dst, src, size) - /* * Validation macros */ @@ -44,7 +40,6 @@ #define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_INVALID_ARG, argPos); #define CHECK_NULL_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_NULL_PTR, argPos); #define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) if(x < min || x > max) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE, argPos); - #define CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, argPos) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, argPos) #else /* empty macros */ #define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x) @@ -52,6 +47,8 @@ #define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) #endif /* !NC_DISABLE_INPUT_VALIDATION */ +#define CHECK_CONTEXT_STATE(ctx, argPos) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(ctx->secpCtx, argPos) + /* * Actual, private defintion of the NCContext structure * to allow for future development and ABI backords @@ -247,7 +244,9 @@ static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _computeConversationKey( ncSpanInitC(&saltSpan, Nip44ConstantSalt, sizeof(Nip44ConstantSalt)); ncSpanInitC(&ikmSpan, sharedSecret->value, NC_SHARED_SEC_SIZE); - return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(&saltSpan, &ikmSpan, ck->value) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; + return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExtract(saltSpan, ikmSpan, ck->value) == CSTATUS_OK + ? NC_SUCCESS + : E_OPERATION_FAILED; } @@ -275,14 +274,13 @@ static cstatus_t _chachaEncipher(const struct nc_expand_keys* keys, NCEncryption static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _getMessageKey( const struct conversation_key* converstationKey, - const cspan_t* nonce, + cspan_t nonce, struct message_key* messageKey ) { cspan_t prkSpan; span_t okmSpan; - DEBUG_ASSERT2(nonce != NULL, "Expected valid nonce buffer") DEBUG_ASSERT2(converstationKey != NULL, "Expected valid conversation key") DEBUG_ASSERT2(messageKey != NULL, "Expected valid message key buffer") @@ -290,10 +288,10 @@ static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _getMessageKey( ncSpanInit(&okmSpan, messageKey->value, sizeof(struct message_key)); /* Output produces a message key (write it directly to struct memory) */ /* Nonce is the info */ - return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(&prkSpan, nonce, &okmSpan); + return ncCryptoSha256HkdfExpand(prkSpan, nonce, okmSpan); } -static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _encryptEx( +static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _encryptNip44Ex( const NCContext* ctx, const struct conversation_key* ck, uint8_t* hmacKey, @@ -312,10 +310,10 @@ static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _encryptEx( result = NC_SUCCESS; - ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); + ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonceData, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); /* Message key will be derrived on every encryption call */ - if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) + if (_getMessageKey(ck, nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) { result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; @@ -339,7 +337,7 @@ Cleanup: return result; } -static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptEx(const NCContext* ctx, const struct conversation_key* ck, NCEncryptionArgs* args) +static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptNip44Ex(const NCContext* ctx, const struct conversation_key* ck, NCEncryptionArgs* args) { NCResult result; cspan_t nonceSpan; @@ -352,9 +350,9 @@ static _nc_fn_inline NCResult _decryptEx(const NCContext* ctx, const struct conv result = NC_SUCCESS; - ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonce32, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); + ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, args->nonceData, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); - if (_getMessageKey(ck, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) + if (_getMessageKey(ck, nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) { result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; @@ -375,17 +373,16 @@ Cleanup: return result; } -static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _computeHmac(const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], const cspan_t* payload, sha256_t hmacOut) +static _nc_fn_inline cstatus_t _computeHmac(const uint8_t key[NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE], cspan_t payload, sha256_t hmacOut) { cspan_t keySpan; DEBUG_ASSERT2(key != NULL, "Expected valid hmac key") - DEBUG_ASSERT2(payload != NULL, "Expected valid mac verification args") DEBUG_ASSERT2(hmacOut != NULL, "Expected valid hmac output buffer") ncSpanInitC(&keySpan, key, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE); - return ncCryptoHmacSha256(&keySpan, payload, hmacOut); + return ncCryptoHmacSha256(keySpan, payload, hmacOut); } static NCResult _verifyMacEx( @@ -411,7 +408,7 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx( * Message key is again required for the hmac verification */ - if (_getMessageKey((struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, &nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) + if (_getMessageKey((struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, nonceSpan, &messageKey) != CSTATUS_OK) { result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; @@ -423,7 +420,7 @@ static NCResult _verifyMacEx( /* * Compute the hmac of the data using the computed hmac key */ - if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) != CSTATUS_OK) + if (_computeHmac(keys->hmac_key, payloadSpan, hmacOut) != CSTATUS_OK) { result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; goto Cleanup; @@ -442,6 +439,40 @@ Cleanup: /* * EXTERNAL API FUNCTIONS */ + + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCResultWithArgPosition(NCResult err, uint8_t argPosition) +{ + return -(((NCResult)argPosition << NC_ARG_POSITION_OFFSET) | -err); +} + +NC_EXPORT int NC_CC NCParseErrorCode(NCResult result, uint8_t* argPositionOut) +{ + NCResult asPositive; + int code; + + /* convert result to a positive value*/ + asPositive = -result; + + /* Get the error code from the lower 8 bits and the argument position from the upper 8 bits*/ + code = -(asPositive & NC_ERROR_CODE_MASK); + + /* Allow argument position assignment to be null */ + if (argPositionOut) + { + *argPositionOut = (asPositive >> NC_ARG_POSITION_OFFSET) & 0xFF; + } + + return code; +} + +/* ============================= +* +* Context functions +* +* ============================= +*/ + NC_EXPORT uint32_t NC_CC NCGetContextStructSize(void) { return sizeof(NCContext); @@ -499,7 +530,13 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDestroyContext(NCContext* ctx) return NC_SUCCESS; } -/* KEY Functions */ +/* ============================= +* +* ECDSA functions +* +* ============================= +*/ + NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetPublicKey( const NCContext* ctx, const NCSecretKey* sk, @@ -615,7 +652,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCSignData( ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize); /* Compute sha256 of the data before signing */ - if(ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK) + if(ncCryptoDigestSha256(dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK) { return E_INVALID_ARG; } @@ -646,7 +683,6 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyDigest( return E_INVALID_ARG; } - /* Verify the signature */ result = secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(ctx->secpCtx, sig64, digest32, 32, &xonly); ZERO_FILL(&xonly, sizeof(xonly)); @@ -674,16 +710,20 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCVerifyData( ncSpanInitC(&dataSpan, data, dataSize); /* Compute sha256 of the data before verifying */ - if (ncCryptoDigestSha256(&dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK) + if (ncCryptoDigestSha256(dataSpan, digest) != CSTATUS_OK) { return E_INVALID_ARG; } - /* Verify the freshly computed digest */ return NCVerifyDigest(ctx, pk, digest, sig64); } -/* ECDH Functions */ +/* ============================= +* +* ECDH functions +* +* ============================= +*/ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCGetSharedSecret( const NCContext* ctx, @@ -765,11 +805,28 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncryptEx( /* Validte ciphertext/plaintext */ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 2) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 2) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 2) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 2) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonceData, 2) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->keyData, 2) CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 2) - return _encryptEx(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args); + switch (args->version) + { + /* TODO: Implement nip04 */ + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + return _encryptNip44Ex( + ctx, + (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, + args->keyData, + args + ); + + default: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncrypt( @@ -792,34 +849,42 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCEncrypt( /* Validate input/output data */ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->hmacKeyOut32, 3) - CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonceData, 3) + + result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; switch(args->version) { case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: - break; /* Allow nip44 */ + { + /* Mac key output is only needed for nip44 */ + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->keyData, 3) + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) + + /* Compute the shared point */ + if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS) + { + goto Cleanup; + } + + /* Compute the conversation key from secret and pubkic keys */ + if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + { + goto Cleanup; + } + + result = _encryptNip44Ex(ctx, &conversationKey, args->keyData, args); + } + + break; /* At the moment nip04 compatability is not supported */ case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04: default: - return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + result = E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + break; } - /* Compute the shared point */ - if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS) - { - goto Cleanup; - } - - /* Compute the conversation key from secret and pubkic keys */ - if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) - { - goto Cleanup; - } - - result = _encryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, args->hmacKeyOut32, args); Cleanup: /* Clean up sensitive data */ @@ -830,8 +895,8 @@ Cleanup: } NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecryptEx( - const NCContext* ctx, - const uint8_t conversationKey[NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE], + const NCContext* ctx, + const uint8_t conversationKey[NC_CONV_KEY_SIZE], NCEncryptionArgs* args ) { @@ -843,10 +908,18 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecryptEx( /* Validte ciphertext/plaintext */ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 2) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 2) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 2) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonceData, 2) CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 2) - return _decryptEx(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args); + switch (args->version) + { + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + return _decryptNip44Ex(ctx, (struct conversation_key*)conversationKey, args); + + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04: + default: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } } NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecrypt( @@ -869,20 +942,34 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCDecrypt( /* Validte ciphertext/plaintext */ CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->inputData, 3) CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->outputData, 3) - CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonce32, 3) + CHECK_INVALID_ARG(args->nonceData, 3) CHECK_ARG_RANGE(args->dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) - if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS) - { - goto Cleanup; - } + result = E_OPERATION_FAILED; - if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + switch (args->version) { - goto Cleanup; + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + { + if ((result = _computeSharedSecret(ctx, sk, pk, &sharedSecret)) != NC_SUCCESS) + { + goto Cleanup; + } + + if ((result = _computeConversationKey(ctx, &sharedSecret, &conversationKey)) != NC_SUCCESS) + { + goto Cleanup; + } + + result = _decryptNip44Ex(ctx, &conversationKey, args); } + break; - result = _decryptEx(ctx, &conversationKey, args); + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04: + default: + result = E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + break; + } Cleanup: /* Clean up sensitive data */ @@ -914,7 +1001,7 @@ NC_EXPORT NCResult NCComputeMac( /* * Compute the hmac of the data using the supplied hmac key */ - return _computeHmac(hmacKey, &payloadSpan, hmacOut) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; + return _computeHmac(hmacKey, payloadSpan, hmacOut) == CSTATUS_OK ? NC_SUCCESS : E_OPERATION_FAILED; } @@ -978,4 +1065,125 @@ Cleanup: ZERO_FILL(&conversationKey, sizeof(conversationKey)); return result; +} + +#define ENSURE_ENC_MODE(args, mode) if(args->version != mode) return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NCSetEncryptionPropertyEx( + NCEncryptionArgs* args, + uint32_t property, + uint8_t* value, + uint32_t valueLen +) +{ + + CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 0) + CHECK_NULL_ARG(value, 2) + + switch (property) + { + case NC_ENC_SET_VERSION: + + /* Ensure version is proper length */ + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(valueLen, sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(uint32_t), 2) + + args->version = *((uint32_t*)value); + + return NC_SUCCESS; + + case NC_ENC_SET_NIP04_IV: + /* + * The safest way to store the nip04 IV is in the nonce + * field. An IV is essentially a nonce. A secure random + * number used to encrypt the first block of a CBC chain. + */ + + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(valueLen, AES_IV_SIZE, UINT32_MAX, 3) + + ENSURE_ENC_MODE(args, NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04) + + args->nonceData = value; + + return NC_SUCCESS; + + + case NC_ENC_SET_NIP04_KEY: + /* + * The AES key is stored in the hmac key field, since + * it won't be used for the operating and should be the same size + * as the hmac key. + */ + + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(valueLen, AES_KEY_SIZE, UINT32_MAX, 3) + + ENSURE_ENC_MODE(args, NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04) + + args->keyData = value; + + return NC_SUCCESS; + + case NC_ENC_SET_NIP44_NONCE: + + /* Nonce buffer must be at least the size, max doesnt matter */ + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(valueLen, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, UINT32_MAX, 3) + + /* Nonce is only used in nip44 mode */ + ENSURE_ENC_MODE(args, NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44) + + args->nonceData = value; + + return NC_SUCCESS; + + case NC_ENC_SET_NIP44_MAC_KEY: + + /* The maximum size of the buffer doesn't matter as long as its larger than the key size */ + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(valueLen, NC_HMAC_KEY_SIZE, UINT32_MAX, 3) + + /* Mac key is only used in nip44 mode */ + ENSURE_ENC_MODE(args, NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44) + + /* + * During encryption the key data buffer is used + * to write the hmac hey used for MAC computation + * operations. + */ + args->keyData = value; + + return NC_SUCCESS; + } + + return E_INVALID_ARG; +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NCSetEncryptionProperty( + NCEncryptionArgs* args, + uint32_t property, + uint32_t value +) +{ + return NCSetEncryptionPropertyEx( + args, + property, + (uint8_t*)&value, + sizeof(uint32_t) + ); +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NCSetEncryptionData( + NCEncryptionArgs* args, + const uint8_t* input, + uint8_t* output, + uint32_t dataSize +) +{ + CHECK_NULL_ARG(args, 0) + CHECK_NULL_ARG(input, 1) + CHECK_NULL_ARG(output, 2) + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(dataSize, NIP44_MIN_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 3) + + args->inputData = input; + args->outputData = output; + args->dataSize = dataSize; + + return NC_SUCCESS; } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/noscryptutil.c b/src/noscryptutil.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4cee2c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/noscryptutil.c @@ -0,0 +1,910 @@ +/* +* Copyright (c) 2024 Vaughn Nugent +* +* Package: noscrypt +* File: noscryptutil.h +* +* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License +* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 +* of the License, or (at your option) any later version. +* +* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +* Lesser General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License +* along with noscrypt. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +*/ + + +#include + +#include "nc-util.h" +#include "nc-crypto.h" + +#include + +/* +* Validation macros +*/ + +#ifdef NC_EXTREME_COMPAT + #error "Utilities library must be disabled when using extreme compat mode" +#endif /* NC_EXTREME_COMPAT */ + +#define MIN_PADDING_SIZE 0x20u +#define NIP44_VERSION_SIZE 0x01u +#define NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE sizeof(uint16_t) + +/* +* minimum size for a valid nip44 payload +* 1 byte version + 32 byte nonce + 32 byte mac + 2 byte ptSize + 32bytes minimum length +*/ +#define NIP44_MIN_PAYLOAD_SIZE (NIP44_VERSION_SIZE + 0x20 + 0x02 + 0x20 + 0x02) + +/* +* Max payload size is the maximum size of the encrypted message +* 1 byte version + 32 byte nonce + 32 byte mac + maximum ciphertext size +*/ +#define NIP44_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE (NIP44_VERSION_SIZE + 0x20 + 0x20 + NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE) + +/* +* The minimum ciphertext size is the minimum padded size + the minimum +* size of the plaintext length field +*/ +#define NIP44_MIN_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE (MIN_PADDING_SIZE + NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE) + + +#define _nc_mem_free(x) if(x != NULL) { free(x); x = NULL; } +#define _nc_mem_alloc(elements, size) calloc(elements, size); +#define ZERO_FILL ncCryptoSecureZero + +#ifndef NC_INPUT_VALIDATION_OFF + #define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_INVALID_ARG, argPos); + #define CHECK_NULL_ARG(x, argPos) if(x == NULL) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_NULL_PTR, argPos); + #define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) if(x < min || x > max) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE, argPos); + #define CHECK_ARG_IS(exp, argPos) if(!(exp)) return NCResultWithArgPosition(E_INVALID_ARG, argPos); +#else + /* empty macros */ + #define CHECK_INVALID_ARG(x) + #define CHECK_NULL_ARG(x, argPos) + #define CHECK_ARG_RANGE(x, min, max, argPos) + #define CHECK_ARG_IS(is, expected, argPos) +#endif /* !NC_DISABLE_INPUT_VALIDATION */ + +#ifdef _NC_IS_WINDOWS + + #include + + /* performs a log2 on integer types */ + #define _math_int_log2(x) (uint32_t)log2((double)x) + +#else + /* + * GCC/clang does not expose log2 so we can use the __builtin_clz + * to find leading zeros of an integer and subtract that from 31 + * (bit positions) for int32 + */ + static _nc_fn_inline uint32_t _math_int_log2(uint32_t val) + { + DEBUG_ASSERT(val < UINT32_MAX); + + return 31 - __builtin_clz(val); + } +#endif + +/* Currently were on nip44 version 2 */ +static const uint8_t Nip44VersionValue[1] = { 0x02u }; + +struct cipher_buffer_state { + + cspan_t input; + span_t output; + + cspan_t actualOutput; +}; + +struct nc_util_enc_struct { + + uint32_t _flags; + + NCEncryptionArgs encArgs; + + struct cipher_buffer_state buffer; +}; + +static _nc_fn_inline span_t _ncUtilAllocSpan(uint32_t count, size_t size) +{ + span_t span; + +#if SIZE_MAX < UINT32_MAX + + if (count > SIZE_MAX) + { + return span; + } + +#endif + + span.data = _nc_mem_alloc((size_t)count, size); + span.size = (uint32_t)count; + + return span; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void _ncUtilZeroSpan(span_t span) +{ + ZERO_FILL(span.data, span.size); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline void _ncUtilFreeSpan(span_t span) +{ + _nc_mem_free(span.data); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline uint32_t _calcNip44PtPadding(uint32_t plaintextSize) +{ + uint32_t chunk, nextPower, factor; + + /* + * Taken from https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/blob/master/44.md + * + * I believe the idea is to add consisten padding for some better + * disgusing of the plainText data. + */ + + if (plaintextSize <= MIN_PADDING_SIZE) + { + return MIN_PADDING_SIZE; + } + + /* Safe to subtract because pt > 0 */ + nextPower = _math_int_log2(plaintextSize - 1); + + nextPower += 1u; + + nextPower = 1 << nextPower; + + if (nextPower <= 256u) + { + chunk = 32u; + } + else + { + chunk = nextPower / 8u; + } + + factor = plaintextSize - 1; + + factor /= chunk; + + factor += 1; + + return chunk * factor; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline uint32_t _calcNip44TotalOutSize(uint32_t inputSize) +{ + uint32_t bufferSize; + + /* + * Buffer size for nip44 is calculated as follows: + * 1 byte for the version + * 32 bytes for the nonce + * 2 bytes for the length of the plainText + * ... padding size + * 32 bytes for the MAC + */ + + bufferSize = NIP44_VERSION_SIZE; + + bufferSize += NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE; + + bufferSize += NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE; + + bufferSize += _calcNip44PtPadding(inputSize); + + bufferSize += NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE; + + return bufferSize; +} + +static _nc_fn_inline span_t _nip44GetMacData(span_t payload) +{ + DEBUG_ASSERT(payload.size > NIP44_VERSION_SIZE + NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE); + + /* + * The nip44 mac is computed over the nonce+encrypted ciphertext + * + * the ciphertext is the entire message buffer, so it includes + * version, nonce, data, padding, and mac space available. + * + * This function will return a span that points to the nonce+data + * segment of the buffer for mac computation. + * + * The nonce sits directly after the version byte, ct is after, + * and the remaining 32 bytes are for the mac. So that means + * macData = ct.size - version.size + mac.size + */ + + return ncSpanSlice( + payload, + NIP44_VERSION_SIZE, + payload.size - (NIP44_VERSION_SIZE + NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE) + ); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline span_t _nip44GetMacOutput(span_t payload) +{ + DEBUG_ASSERT(payload.size > NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE); + + /* + * Mac is the final 32 bytes of the ciphertext buffer + */ + return ncSpanSlice( + payload, + payload.size - NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE, + NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE + ); +} + +static _nc_fn_inline int _nip44ParseSegments( + cspan_t payload, + cspan_t* nonce, + cspan_t* mac, + cspan_t* macData, + cspan_t* cipherText +) +{ + if (payload.size < NIP44_MIN_PAYLOAD_SIZE) + { + return 0; + } + + /* slice after the version and before the mac segments */ + *nonce = ncSpanSliceC( + payload, + NIP44_VERSION_SIZE, + NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE + ); + + /* + * Mac is the final 32 bytes of the ciphertext buffer + */ + *mac = ncSpanSliceC( + payload, + payload.size - NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE, + NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE + ); + + /* + * The mac data is the nonce+ct segment of the buffer for mac computation. + */ + *macData = ncSpanSliceC( + payload, + NIP44_VERSION_SIZE, + payload.size - (NIP44_VERSION_SIZE + NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE) + ); + + /* + * Ciphertext is after the nonce segment and before the mac segment + */ + *cipherText = ncSpanSliceC( + payload, + NIP44_VERSION_SIZE + NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE, + payload.size - (NIP44_VERSION_SIZE + NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE + NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE) + ); + + return 1; +} + + +static _nc_fn_inline void _cipherPublishOutput(NCUtilCipherContext* buffer, uint32_t offset, uint32_t size) +{ + span_t slice; + + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanIsValid(buffer->buffer.output)); + + if (size == 0) + { + ncSpanInitC(&buffer->buffer.actualOutput, NULL, 0); + } + else + { + /* use slice for debug guards */ + slice = ncSpanSlice(buffer->buffer.output, offset, size); + + /* init readonly span from mutable */ + ncSpanInitC( + &buffer->buffer.actualOutput, + ncSpanGetOffset(slice, 0), + ncSpanGetSize(slice) + ); + } +} + +/* +* I want the encryption/decyption functions to be indempodent +* meaning all mutations that happen can be repeated without +* side effects. IE no perminent state changes that can't be +* undone. +*/ + +static NCResult _nip44EncryptCompleteCore( + const NCContext* libContext, + const NCSecretKey* sk, + const NCPublicKey* pk, + NCUtilCipherContext* state +) +{ + + NCResult result; + cspan_t plainText; + span_t macData, macOutput, message; + uint32_t outPos; + uint8_t ptSize[NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE]; + uint8_t hmacKeyOut[NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE]; + NCEncryptionArgs encArgs; + + outPos = 0; + encArgs = state->encArgs; + message = state->buffer.output; + plainText = state->buffer.input; + + DEBUG_ASSERT(encArgs.version == NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44); + + ZERO_FILL(hmacKeyOut, sizeof(hmacKeyOut)); + + /* Start by appending the version number */ + ncSpanAppend(message, &outPos, Nip44VersionValue, sizeof(Nip44VersionValue)); + + /* next is nonce data */ + ncSpanAppend(message, &outPos, encArgs.nonceData, NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); + DEBUG_ASSERT(outPos == 1 + NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE); + + /* + * Assign the hmac key from the stack buffer. Since the args structure + * is copied, it won't leak the address to the stack buffer. + * + * Should always return success for nip44 because all properties are valid + * addresses. + */ + + result = NCSetEncryptionPropertyEx( + &encArgs, + NC_ENC_SET_NIP44_MAC_KEY, + hmacKeyOut, + sizeof(hmacKeyOut) + ); + + DEBUG_ASSERT(result == NC_SUCCESS); + + /* + * So this is the tricky part. The encryption operation appens directly + * on the ciphertext segment + * + * All current implementations allow overlapping input and output buffers + * so we can assign the pt segment on the encryption args + */ + + /* + * Since the message size and padding bytes will get encrypted, + * the buffer should currently point to the start of the encryption segment + * + * The size of the data to encrypt is the padded size plus the size of the + * plainText size field. + */ + + result = NCSetEncryptionData( + &encArgs, + ncSpanGetOffset(message, outPos), /* in place encryption */ + ncSpanGetOffset(message, outPos), + NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE + _calcNip44PtPadding(plainText.size) /* Plaintext + pt size must be encrypted */ + ); + + DEBUG_ASSERT(result == NC_SUCCESS); + + /* big endian plaintext size */ + ptSize[0] = (uint8_t)(ncSpanGetSizeC(plainText) >> 8); + ptSize[1] = (uint8_t)(ncSpanGetSizeC(plainText) & 0xFF); + + /* + * Written position must point to the end of the padded ciphertext + * area which the plaintext is written to. + * + * The plaintext data will be encrypted in place. The encrypted + * data is the entired padded region containing the leading byte count + * the plaintext data, followed by zero padding. + */ + + ncSpanWrite(message, outPos, ptSize, sizeof(ptSize)); + + ncSpanWrite( + message, + outPos + NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE, /* write pt directly after length */ + ncSpanGetOffsetC(plainText, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(plainText) + ); + + /* Move position pointer directly after final padding bytes */ + outPos += encArgs.dataSize; + + result = NCEncrypt(libContext, sk, pk, &encArgs); + + if (result != NC_SUCCESS) + { + return result; + } + + /* + MAC is computed over the nonce+encrypted data + this helper captures that data segment into a span + */ + + macData = _nip44GetMacData(message); + macOutput = _nip44GetMacOutput(message); + + result = NCComputeMac( + libContext, + hmacKeyOut, + ncSpanGetOffset(macData, 0), + ncSpanGetSize(macData), + ncSpanGetOffset(macOutput, 0) + ); + + if (result != NC_SUCCESS) + { + return result; + } + + outPos += NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE; + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(outPos == message.size, "Buffer under/overflow detected"); + + /* publish all message bytes to output */ + _cipherPublishOutput(state, 0, outPos); + + /* zero hmac key before returning */ + ZERO_FILL(hmacKeyOut, sizeof(hmacKeyOut)); + + return NC_SUCCESS; +} + +static NCResult _nip44DecryptCompleteCore( + const NCContext* libContext, + const NCSecretKey* recvKey, + const NCPublicKey* sendKey, + NCUtilCipherContext* state +) +{ + NCResult result; + NCMacVerifyArgs macArgs; + NCEncryptionArgs encArgs; + cspan_t macData, macValue, nonce, payload, cipherText; + span_t output; + uint16_t ptSize; + + DEBUG_ASSERT(libContext && recvKey && sendKey && state); + DEBUG_ASSERT(state->encArgs.version == NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44); + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanGetSizeC(state->buffer.input) >= NIP44_MIN_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + + /* ensure decryption mode */ + DEBUG_ASSERT(state->_flags & NC_UTIL_CIPHER_MODE_DECRYPT); + + /* store local stack copy for safe mutation */ + encArgs = state->encArgs; + payload = state->buffer.input; + output = state->buffer.output; + + /* + * Copy the input buffer to the output buffer because the + * decryption happens in-place and needs a writable buffer + * + * After the operation is complete, we will assign the actual plaintext + * data to the actual output buffer + */ + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanIsValid(output), "Output buffer was not allocated"); + + if (!_nip44ParseSegments(payload, &nonce, &macValue, &macData, &cipherText)) + { + return E_CIPHER_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* Verify mac if the user allowed it */ + if ((state->_flags & NC_UTIL_CIPHER_MAC_NO_VERIFY) == 0) + { + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanGetSizeC(macValue) == NC_ENCRYPTION_MAC_SIZE); + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanGetSizeC(macData) > NC_ENCRYPTION_NONCE_SIZE + MIN_PADDING_SIZE); + + /* Assign the mac data to the mac verify args */ + macArgs.mac32 = ncSpanGetOffsetC(macValue, 0); + macArgs.nonce32 = ncSpanGetOffsetC(nonce, 0); + + /* message for verifying a mac in nip44 is the nonce+ciphertext */ + macArgs.payload = ncSpanGetOffsetC(macData, 0); + macArgs.payloadSize = ncSpanGetSizeC(macData); + + /* Verify the mac */ + result = NCVerifyMac(libContext, recvKey, sendKey, &macArgs); + + /* When the mac is invlaid */ + if (result == E_OPERATION_FAILED) + { + return E_CIPHER_MAC_INVALID; + } + /* argument errors */ + else if (result != NC_SUCCESS) + { + return result; + } + } + + /* + * manually assign nonce because it's a constant pointer which + * is not allowed when calling setproperty + */ + encArgs.nonceData = ncSpanGetOffsetC(nonce, 0); + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(cipherText.size >= MIN_PADDING_SIZE, "Cipertext segment was parsed incorrectly. Too small"); + + result = NCSetEncryptionData( + &encArgs, + ncSpanGetOffsetC(cipherText, 0), + ncSpanGetOffset(output, 0), /*decrypt ciphertext and write directly to the output buffer */ + ncSpanGetSizeC(cipherText) + ); + + DEBUG_ASSERT(result == NC_SUCCESS); + + /* + * If decryption was successful, the data should be written + * directly to the output buffer + */ + result = NCDecrypt(libContext, recvKey, sendKey, &encArgs); + + if (result != NC_SUCCESS) + { + return result; + } + + /* + * Parse CT length and assign the output buffer. + * + * PT size is stored at the beginning of the ciphertext + * segment and is 2 bytes in size, big endian. + */ + + ptSize = (uint16_t)(output.data[0] << 8 | output.data[1]); + + /* + * If the PT is corrupted or set maliciously, it can overrun + * the current buffer. The PT size must be less than the + * ciphertext size. + */ + if (!ncSpanIsValidRange(output, NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE, ptSize)) + { + return E_OPERATION_FAILED; + } + + /* + * actual output span should now point to the decrypted plaintext + * data segment + */ + _cipherPublishOutput(state, NIP44_PT_LEN_SIZE, ptSize); + + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanGetSizeC(state->buffer.actualOutput) < cipherText.size); + + return NC_SUCCESS; +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCUtilGetEncryptionPaddedSize(uint32_t encVersion, uint32_t plaintextSize) +{ + switch (encVersion) + { + default: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04: + return plaintextSize; + + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + + /* + * Ensure the plaintext size if a nip44 message does not exceed the maximum size + */ + CHECK_ARG_IS(plaintextSize - 1 <= NIP44_MAX_ENC_MESSAGE_SIZE, 1); + + return (NCResult)(_calcNip44PtPadding(plaintextSize)); + } +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCUtilGetEncryptionBufferSize(uint32_t encVersion, uint32_t plaintextSize) +{ + + switch (encVersion) + { + default: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + + /* + * NIP-04 simply uses AES to 1:1 encrypt the plainText + * to ciphertext. + */ + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP04: + return plaintextSize; + + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + return (NCResult)(_calcNip44TotalOutSize(plaintextSize)); + } +} + + +NC_EXPORT NCUtilCipherContext* NC_CC NCUtilCipherAlloc(uint32_t encVersion, uint32_t flags) +{ + NCUtilCipherContext* encCtx; + + /* + * Alloc context on heap + */ + encCtx = (NCUtilCipherContext*)_nc_mem_alloc(1, sizeof(NCUtilCipherContext)); + + if (encCtx != NULL) + { + encCtx->encArgs.version = encVersion; + encCtx->_flags = flags; + } + + return encCtx; +} + +NC_EXPORT void NC_CC NCUtilCipherFree(NCUtilCipherContext* encCtx) +{ + if (!encCtx) + { + return; + } + + /* + * If zero on free flag is set, we can zero all output memory + * before returning the buffer back to the heap + */ + if ((encCtx->_flags & NC_UTIL_CIPHER_ZERO_ON_FREE) > 0 && ncSpanIsValid(encCtx->buffer.output)) + { + _ncUtilZeroSpan(encCtx->buffer.output); + } + + /* Free output buffers (null buffers are allowed) */ + _ncUtilFreeSpan(encCtx->buffer.output); + + /* context can be released */ + _nc_mem_free(encCtx); +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCUtilCipherInit( + NCUtilCipherContext* encCtx, + const uint8_t* inputData, + uint32_t inputSize +) +{ + NCResult outputSize; + + CHECK_NULL_ARG(encCtx, 0); + CHECK_NULL_ARG(inputData, 1); + + if ((encCtx->_flags & NC_UTIL_CIPHER_MODE_DECRYPT) > 0) + { + /* + * Validate the input data for proper format for + * the current state version + */ + switch (encCtx->encArgs.version) + { + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + { + if (inputSize < NIP44_MIN_PAYLOAD_SIZE) + { + return E_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_SIZE; + } + + if (inputSize > NIP44_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE) + { + return E_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_SIZE; + } + + /* Ensure the first byte is a valid version */ + if (inputData[0] != Nip44VersionValue[0]) + { + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + break; + } + default: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* + * Alloc a the output buffer to be the same size as the input + * data for decryption because the output will always be equal + * or smaller than the input data. This is an over-alloc but + * that should be fine + */ + + outputSize = inputSize; + } + else + { + /* + * Calculate the correct output size to store the encryption + * data for the given state version + */ + outputSize = NCUtilGetEncryptionBufferSize(encCtx->encArgs.version, inputSize); + + if (outputSize < 0) + { + return E_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_SIZE; + } + } + + DEBUG_ASSERT(outputSize > 0); + + /* + * If the buffer was previously allocated, the reuseable flag + * must be set to allow the buffer to be re-used for another + * operation. + */ + + if (ncSpanIsValid(encCtx->buffer.output)) + { + CHECK_ARG_IS((encCtx->_flags & NC_UTIL_CIPHER_REUSEABLE) > 0, 0); + + /* + * if the existing buffer is large enough to hold the new + * data reuse it, otherwise free it and allocate a new buffer + */ + + if (outputSize <= encCtx->buffer.output.size) + { + _ncUtilZeroSpan(encCtx->buffer.output); + + goto AssignInputAndExit; + } + else + { + _ncUtilFreeSpan(encCtx->buffer.output); + } + } + + /* Alloc output buffer within the struct */ + encCtx->buffer.output = _ncUtilAllocSpan((uint32_t)outputSize, sizeof(uint8_t)); + + if (!ncSpanIsValid(encCtx->buffer.output)) + { + return E_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + +AssignInputAndExit: + + /* Confirm output was allocated */ + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanIsValid(encCtx->buffer.output)); + + /* Assign the input data span to point to the assigned input data */ + ncSpanInitC(&encCtx->buffer.input, inputData, inputSize); + + return NC_SUCCESS; +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCUtilCipherGetFlags(const NCUtilCipherContext* ctx) +{ + CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0); + + return (NCResult)(ctx->_flags); +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCUtilCipherGetOutputSize(const NCUtilCipherContext* encCtx) +{ + CHECK_NULL_ARG(encCtx, 0); + + if (!ncSpanIsValidC(encCtx->buffer.actualOutput)) + { + return E_CIPHER_NO_OUTPUT; + } + + return (NCResult)(encCtx->buffer.actualOutput.size); +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCUtilCipherReadOutput( + const NCUtilCipherContext* encCtx, + uint8_t* output, + uint32_t outputSize +) +{ + CHECK_NULL_ARG(encCtx, 0); + CHECK_NULL_ARG(output, 1); + + if (!ncSpanIsValidC(encCtx->buffer.actualOutput)) + { + return E_CIPHER_NO_OUTPUT; + } + + /* Buffer must be as large as the output data */ + CHECK_ARG_RANGE(outputSize, encCtx->buffer.actualOutput.size, UINT32_MAX, 2); + + ncSpanReadC( + encCtx->buffer.actualOutput, + output, + outputSize + ); + + return (NCResult)encCtx->buffer.actualOutput.size; +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NCUtilCipherSetProperty( + NCUtilCipherContext* ctx, + uint32_t property, + uint8_t* value, + uint32_t valueLen +) +{ + CHECK_NULL_ARG(ctx, 0) + + /* All other arguments are verified */ + return NCSetEncryptionPropertyEx( + &ctx->encArgs, + property, + value, + valueLen + ); +} + +NC_EXPORT NCResult NC_CC NCUtilCipherUpdate( + NCUtilCipherContext* encCtx, + const NCContext* libContext, + const NCSecretKey* sk, + const NCPublicKey* pk +) +{ + CHECK_NULL_ARG(encCtx, 0); + CHECK_NULL_ARG(libContext, 1); + CHECK_NULL_ARG(sk, 2); + CHECK_NULL_ARG(pk, 3); + + /* Make sure input & output buffers have been assigned/allocated */ + if (!ncSpanIsValid(encCtx->buffer.output)) + { + return E_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } + if (!ncSpanIsValidC(encCtx->buffer.input)) + { + return E_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } + + /* Reset output data pointer incase it has been moved */ + _cipherPublishOutput(encCtx, 0, 0); + + switch (encCtx->encArgs.version) + { + case NC_ENC_VERSION_NIP44: + + if ((encCtx->_flags & NC_UTIL_CIPHER_MODE_DECRYPT) > 0) + { + return _nip44DecryptCompleteCore(libContext, sk, pk, encCtx); + } + else + { + /* Ensure the user manually specified a nonce buffer for encryption mode */ + if (!encCtx->encArgs.nonceData) + { + return E_CIPHER_BAD_NONCE; + } + + return _nip44EncryptCompleteCore(libContext, sk, pk, encCtx); + } + + default: + return E_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} diff --git a/src/providers/bcrypt.c b/src/providers/bcrypt.c index d1b9aa5..b9c370b 100644 --- a/src/providers/bcrypt.c +++ b/src/providers/bcrypt.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Copyright (c) 2024 Vaughn Nugent * * Package: noscrypt -* File: impl/bcrypt.c +* File: providers/bcrypt.c * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ _IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcInitSha256(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, DWORD flags) return result; } -_IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcCreateHmac(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, const cspan_t* key) +_IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcCreateHmac(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, cspan_t key) { /* * NOTE: @@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ _IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcCreateHmac(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, const cspan_t* key) &ctx->hHash, NULL, 0, - (uint8_t*)key->data, - key->size, + (uint8_t*)ncSpanGetOffsetC(key, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(key), BCRYPT_HASH_REUSABLE_FLAG /* Enable reusable for expand function */ ); } @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ _IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcCreate(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx) /* Zero out key span for 0 size and NULL data ptr */ SecureZeroMemory(&key, sizeof(cspan_t)); - return _bcCreateHmac(ctx, &key); + return _bcCreateHmac(ctx, key); } _IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcHashDataRaw(const struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, const uint8_t* data, uint32_t len) @@ -100,9 +100,13 @@ _IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcHashDataRaw(const struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, const uint8_t* d return BCryptHashData(ctx->hHash, (uint8_t*)data, len, 0); } -_IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcHashData(const struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, const cspan_t* data) +_IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcHashData(const struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, cspan_t data) { - return _bcHashDataRaw(ctx, data->data, data->size); + return _bcHashDataRaw( + ctx, + ncSpanGetOffsetC(data, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(data) + ); } _IMPLSTB NTSTATUS _bcFinishHash(const struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx, sha256_t digestOut32) @@ -118,8 +122,8 @@ _IMPLSTB void _bcDestroyCtx(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx) /* Close the algorithm provider */ if (ctx->hAlg) BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(ctx->hAlg, 0); - ctx->hAlg = NULL; ctx->hHash = NULL; + ctx->hAlg = NULL; } #ifndef _IMPL_SECURE_ZERO_MEMSET @@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ _IMPLSTB void _bcDestroyCtx(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx) /* Export function fallack */ #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_DIGEST _bcrypt_sha256_digest - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _bcrypt_sha256_digest(const cspan_t* data, sha256_t digestOut32) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _bcrypt_sha256_digest(cspan_t data, sha256_t digestOut32) { cstatus_t result; struct _bcrypt_ctx ctx; @@ -177,7 +181,7 @@ _IMPLSTB void _bcDestroyCtx(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx) /* Export function */ #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HMAC _bcrypt_hmac_sha256 - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _bcrypt_hmac_sha256(const cspan_t* key, const cspan_t* data, sha256_t hmacOut32) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _bcrypt_hmac_sha256(cspan_t key, cspan_t data, sha256_t hmacOut32) { cstatus_t result; struct _bcrypt_ctx ctx; @@ -213,7 +217,7 @@ _IMPLSTB void _bcDestroyCtx(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx) #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXPAND _bcrypt_fallback_hkdf_expand - cstatus_t _bcrypt_hkdf_update(void* ctx, const cspan_t* data) + static cstatus_t _bcrypt_hkdf_update(void* ctx, cspan_t data) { DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx != NULL) @@ -221,15 +225,16 @@ _IMPLSTB void _bcDestroyCtx(struct _bcrypt_ctx* ctx) return CSTATUS_OK; } - cstatus_t _bcrypt_hkdf_finish(void* ctx, sha256_t hmacOut32) + static cstatus_t _bcrypt_hkdf_finish(void* ctx, sha256_t hmacOut32) { - DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx != NULL) + DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx != NULL); + DEBUG_ASSERT(hmacOut32 != NULL); BC_FAIL(_bcFinishHash((struct _bcrypt_ctx*)ctx, hmacOut32)) return CSTATUS_OK; } - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _bcrypt_fallback_hkdf_expand(const cspan_t* prk, const cspan_t* info, span_t* okm) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _bcrypt_fallback_hkdf_expand(cspan_t prk, cspan_t info, span_t okm) { cstatus_t result; struct _bcrypt_ctx ctx; diff --git a/src/providers/mbedtls.c b/src/providers/mbedtls.c index df5201f..ead3279 100644 --- a/src/providers/mbedtls.c +++ b/src/providers/mbedtls.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Copyright (c) 2024 Vaughn Nugent * * Package: noscrypt -* File: mbedtls.c +* File: providers/mbedtls.c * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License @@ -95,13 +95,13 @@ _IMPLSTB const mbedtls_md_info_t* _mbed_sha256_alg(void) #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_DIGEST _mbed_sha256_digest - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _mbed_sha256_digest(const cspan_t* data, sha256_t digestOut32) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _mbed_sha256_digest(cspan_t data, sha256_t digestOut32) { - _overflow_check(data->size) + _overflow_check(data.size) return mbedtls_sha256( - data->data, - data->size, + data.data, + data.size, digestOut32, 0 /* Set 0 for sha256 mode */ ) == 0 ? CSTATUS_OK : CSTATUS_FAIL; @@ -114,19 +114,19 @@ _IMPLSTB const mbedtls_md_info_t* _mbed_sha256_alg(void) #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HMAC _mbed_sha256_hmac - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _mbed_sha256_hmac(const cspan_t* key, const cspan_t* data, sha256_t hmacOut32) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _mbed_sha256_hmac(cspan_t key, cspan_t data, sha256_t hmacOut32) { - _overflow_check(data->size) + _overflow_check(data.size) /* Keys should never be large enough for this to matter, but sanity check. */ - DEBUG_ASSERT2(key->size < SIZE_MAX, "Expected key size to be less than SIZE_MAX") + DEBUG_ASSERT2(key.size < SIZE_MAX, "Expected key size to be less than SIZE_MAX") return mbedtls_md_hmac( _mbed_sha256_alg(), - key->data, - key->size, - data->data, - data->size, + key.data, + key.size, + data.data, + data.size, hmacOut32 ) == 0 ? CSTATUS_OK : CSTATUS_FAIL; } @@ -137,21 +137,21 @@ _IMPLSTB const mbedtls_md_info_t* _mbed_sha256_alg(void) #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXPAND _mbed_sha256_hkdf_expand - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _mbed_sha256_hkdf_expand(const cspan_t* prk, const cspan_t* info, span_t* okm) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _mbed_sha256_hkdf_expand(cspan_t prk, cspan_t info, span_t okm) { /* These sizes should never be large enough to overflow on <64bit platforms, but sanity check */ - DEBUG_ASSERT(okm->size < SIZE_MAX) - DEBUG_ASSERT(prk->size < SIZE_MAX) - DEBUG_ASSERT(info->size < SIZE_MAX) + DEBUG_ASSERT(okm.size < SIZE_MAX) + DEBUG_ASSERT(prk.size < SIZE_MAX) + DEBUG_ASSERT(info.size < SIZE_MAX) return mbedtls_hkdf_expand( _mbed_sha256_alg(), - prk->data, - prk->size, - info->data, - info->size, - okm->data, - okm->size + prk.data, + prk.size, + info.data, + info.size, + okm.data, + okm.size ) == 0 ? CSTATUS_OK : CSTATUS_FAIL; } diff --git a/src/providers/monocypher.c b/src/providers/monocypher.c index 8ffe048..c35f63e 100644 --- a/src/providers/monocypher.c +++ b/src/providers/monocypher.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Copyright (c) 2024 Vaughn Nugent * * Package: noscrypt -* File: impl/monocypher.c +* File: providers/monocypher.c * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License diff --git a/src/providers/openssl.c b/src/providers/openssl.c index 1f31796..c2933fb 100644 --- a/src/providers/openssl.c +++ b/src/providers/openssl.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Copyright (c) 2024 Vaughn Nugent * * Package: noscrypt -* File: impl/openssl.c +* File: providers/openssl.c * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ #define _OSSL_FAIL(x) if(!(x)) return CSTATUS_FAIL; +#define ossl_md_sha256() EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, "SHA2-256", NULL) +#define ossl_evp_fetch_chacha20() EVP_CIPHER_fetch(NULL, "ChaCha20", NULL) +#define ossl_mac_fetch_hmac() EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "hmac", NULL) + #ifndef _IMPL_SECURE_ZERO_MEMSET #define _IMPL_SECURE_ZERO_MEMSET _ossl_secure_zero_memset @@ -63,11 +67,20 @@ #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_DIGEST _ossl_sha256_digest - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_sha256_digest(const cspan_t* data, sha256_t digestOut32) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_sha256_digest(cspan_t data, sha256_t digestOut32) { - _overflow_check(data->size) + _overflow_check(data.size); + + DEBUG_ASSERT(digestOut32 != NULL); + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanIsValidC(data)); - _OSSL_FAIL(SHA256(data->data, data->size, digestOut32)) + _OSSL_FAIL( + SHA256( + ncSpanGetOffsetC(data, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(data), + digestOut32 + ) + ); return CSTATUS_OK; } @@ -81,29 +94,29 @@ /* Export function */ #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HMAC _ossl_hmac_sha256 - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_hmac_sha256(const cspan_t* key, const cspan_t* data, sha256_t hmacOut32) + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_hmac_sha256(cspan_t key, cspan_t data, sha256_t hmacOut32) { unsigned int hmacLen; - _overflow_check(key->size) - _overflow_check(data->size) + _overflow_check(key.size) + _overflow_check(data.size) hmacLen = sizeof(sha256_t); _OSSL_FAIL( HMAC( - EVP_sha256(), - key->data, - key->size, - data->data, - data->size, + ossl_md_sha256(), + ncSpanGetOffsetC(key, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(key), + ncSpanGetOffsetC(data, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(data), hmacOut32, &hmacLen ) - ) + ); /* digest length should match the actual digest size */ - DEBUG_ASSERT(hmacLen == sizeof(sha256_t)) + DEBUG_ASSERT(hmacLen == sizeof(sha256_t)); return CSTATUS_OK; } @@ -112,73 +125,144 @@ #ifndef _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXPAND - #include + #include #define _IMPL_CRYPTO_SHA256_HKDF_EXPAND _ossl_sha256_hkdf_expand - cstatus_t _ossl_hkdf_update(void* ctx, const cspan_t* data) + struct ossl_hmac_state { + EVP_MAC_CTX* libCtx; + OSSL_PARAM params[2]; + cspan_t prk; + }; + + static cstatus_t _ossl_hmac_init(const struct ossl_hmac_state* osslCtx) { - DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx != NULL) + DEBUG_ASSERT(ncSpanIsValidC(osslCtx->prk)); + DEBUG_ASSERT(osslCtx->params != NULL); - _overflow_check(data->size) + _OSSL_FAIL( + EVP_MAC_init( + osslCtx->libCtx, + ncSpanGetOffsetC(osslCtx->prk, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(osslCtx->prk), + osslCtx->params + ) + ); - _OSSL_FAIL(EVP_DigestUpdate((EVP_MD_CTX*)ctx, data->data, data->size)) - return CSTATUS_OK; } - cstatus_t _ossl_hkdf_finish(void* ctx, sha256_t hmacOut32) + static cstatus_t _ossl_hkdf_update(void* ctx, cspan_t data) { - unsigned int hmacSize; + const struct ossl_hmac_state* osslCtx; - DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx != NULL) + DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx != NULL); + _overflow_check(data.size); - hmacSize = sizeof(sha256_t); + osslCtx = (const struct ossl_hmac_state*)ctx; - _OSSL_FAIL(EVP_DigestFinal_ex((EVP_MD_CTX*)ctx, hmacOut32, &hmacSize)) + DEBUG_ASSERT(osslCtx->libCtx != NULL); - /* When configured for sha256, should always be the same size in/out */ - DEBUG_ASSERT(hmacSize == sizeof(sha256_t)) + _OSSL_FAIL( + EVP_MAC_update( + osslCtx->libCtx, + ncSpanGetOffsetC(data, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(data) + ) + ); return CSTATUS_OK; } - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_sha256_hkdf_expand(const cspan_t* prk, const cspan_t* info, span_t* okm) + static cstatus_t _ossl_hkdf_finish(void* ctx, sha256_t hmacOut32) { - EVP_MD_CTX* ctx; + const struct ossl_hmac_state* osslCtx; + size_t hmacSize; + + DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx != NULL); + DEBUG_ASSERT(hmacOut32 != NULL); + + osslCtx = (const struct ossl_hmac_state*)ctx; + hmacSize = 0; + + DEBUG_ASSERT(osslCtx->libCtx != NULL); + + _OSSL_FAIL( + EVP_MAC_final( + osslCtx->libCtx, + hmacOut32, + &hmacSize, + sizeof(sha256_t) + ) + ); + + /* When configured for sha256, should always be the same size in/out */ + DEBUG_ASSERT(hmacSize == sizeof(sha256_t)); + + /* + * Context must be re-initalized after finalize + * See lifecycle https://docs.openssl.org/3.0/man7/life_cycle-mac/#copyright + */ + + return _ossl_hmac_init(osslCtx); + } + + + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_sha256_hkdf_expand(cspan_t prk, cspan_t info, span_t okm) + { + EVP_MAC* mac; cstatus_t result; - struct nc_hkdf_fn_cb_struct handler; + struct ossl_hmac_state hkdfState; + struct nc_hkdf_fn_cb_struct handler; result = CSTATUS_FAIL; + + handler.update = _ossl_hkdf_update; + handler.finish = _ossl_hkdf_finish; + _overflow_check(prk.size); + _overflow_check(info.size); + _overflow_check(okm.size); + + hkdfState.params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("digest", "sha256", 0); + hkdfState.params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + hkdfState.prk = prk; + /* - * NOTE! Hmac reusable flag must be set to allow for multiple - * calls to the finish function without losing the context. + * Silly openssl stuff. Enable hmac with sha256 using the system default + * security provider. The one-shot flag must also be disabled (0) because + * we need to call update multiple times. */ - if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) + mac = ossl_mac_fetch_hmac(); + + if (mac == NULL) { - return CSTATUS_FAIL; + goto Cleanup; } - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex2(ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) + hkdfState.libCtx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac); + + if (hkdfState.libCtx == NULL) { goto Cleanup; } - if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, prk->data, prk->size)) + if (_ossl_hmac_init(&hkdfState) != CSTATUS_OK) { goto Cleanup; } - - handler.update = _ossl_hkdf_update; - handler.finish = _ossl_hkdf_finish; - result = hkdfExpandProcess(&handler, ctx, info, okm); + DEBUG_ASSERT(EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(hkdfState.libCtx) == sizeof(sha256_t)); - Cleanup: + /* Pass the library */ + result = hkdfExpandProcess(&handler, &hkdfState, info, okm); - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); + Cleanup: + + if (hkdfState.libCtx) EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hkdfState.libCtx); + if (mac) EVP_MAC_free(mac); return result; } @@ -191,39 +275,130 @@ #define _IMPL_CHACHA20_CRYPT _ossl_chacha20_crypt - _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_chacha20_crypt( - const uint8_t* key, - const uint8_t* nonce, - const uint8_t* input, - uint8_t* output, - uint32_t dataLen + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_cipher_core( + const EVP_CIPHER* cipher, + cspan_t key, + cspan_t iv, + cspan_t input, + span_t output ) { cstatus_t result; EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx; + int tempLen, osslResult; + + DEBUG_ASSERT2(ncSpanGetSize(output) <= ncSpanGetSizeC(input), "Output buffer must be equal or larger than the input buffer"); + DEBUG_ASSERT(cipher != NULL); + + DEBUG_ASSERT((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(cipher) == ncSpanGetSizeC(key)); + DEBUG_ASSERT((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) == ncSpanGetSizeC(iv)); result = CSTATUS_FAIL; - if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + + if (ctx == NULL) { - return CSTATUS_FAIL; + goto Cleanup; } - if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_chacha20(), NULL, key, nonce)) + osslResult = EVP_EncryptInit_ex2( + ctx, + cipher, + ncSpanGetOffsetC(key, 0), + ncSpanGetOffsetC(iv, 0), + NULL + ); + + if (!osslResult) { goto Cleanup; } - if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, output, (int*)&dataLen, input, dataLen)) + osslResult = EVP_EncryptUpdate( + ctx, + ncSpanGetOffset(output, 0), + &tempLen, + ncSpanGetOffsetC(input, 0), + ncSpanGetSizeC(input) + ); + + if (!osslResult) { goto Cleanup; } + /* + * We can't get a pointer outside the range of the + * output buffer + */ + if (((uint32_t)tempLen) < ncSpanGetSize(output)) + { + if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ncSpanGetOffset(output, tempLen), &tempLen)) + { + goto Cleanup; + } + } + result = CSTATUS_OK; Cleanup: - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + if (ctx) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + return result; + } + + _IMPLSTB cstatus_t _ossl_chacha20_crypt( + const uint8_t* key, + const uint8_t* nonce, + const uint8_t* input, + uint8_t* output, + uint32_t dataLen + ) + { + cstatus_t result; + EVP_CIPHER* cipher; + uint8_t chaChaIv[CHACHA_NONCE_SIZE + 4]; + cspan_t keySpan, nonceSpan, inputSpan; + span_t outputSpan; + + result = CSTATUS_FAIL; + + /* + * RFC 7539 ChaCha20 requires a 16 byte initialization vector. A + * counter value is preprended to the nonce to make up the 16 byte + * size. + * + * The counter is always set to 0 for the nonce. + */ + + ncCryptoSecureZero(chaChaIv, sizeof(chaChaIv)); + MEMMOV(chaChaIv + 4, nonce, CHACHA_NONCE_SIZE); + + ncSpanInitC(&keySpan, key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); + ncSpanInitC(&nonceSpan, chaChaIv, sizeof(chaChaIv)); + ncSpanInitC(&inputSpan, input, dataLen); + ncSpanInit(&outputSpan, output, dataLen); + + cipher = ossl_evp_fetch_chacha20(); + + if (cipher == NULL) + { + goto Cleanup; + } + + result = _ossl_cipher_core( + cipher, + keySpan, + nonceSpan, + inputSpan, + outputSpan + ); + + Cleanup: + + if (cipher) EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); return result; } -- cgit